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ABSTRACT
In 1904, the John A. Roebling's Sons Company began construction ofthe
Kinkora Works, a state of the art steel making, rod rolling, and wire drawing facility.
During their ownership (1904-1953), the Roeblings implemented many of the significant
developments in wire making at Kinkora while producing the wire used in some of
America's most noted engineering achievements, including several prominent cable
suspension bridges. The persistence ofprivate, family ownership and craft production at
the Roebling Company reveals another side ofAmerican industry during an era and
industry dominated by corporate conglomerations. This thesis argues that Kinkora
represented a response to the growth of oligopoly in the steel industry through its
construction as a "two sphere production system": a system that implemented strategies
ofboth mass and niche market production. Special attention is paid to how
.manufacturing technologies and products affected the relationships between management,
labor, and engineering at the Kinkora Works, relationships that have significance for
understanding the variety of forms industrial development in America took in the
twentieth century.
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While the technology of steel has long provided a locus for historians seeking to
uncover the character and organizational structure ofAmerican industry, little attention
has been paid to the role of the wire industry in this history. The more familiar ferrous
products such as rails, battleship armor, structural members, and automobile steel have
become icons ofmodernization in the United States; yet wire and wire rope have
arguably played as essential a role in the growth of the industrial state. Many of the
notable nineteenth- and early twentieth-century engineering achievements in the United
States including the Panama Canal, Empire State Building, massive federal dam projects,
and long span cable suspension bridges, supported by wire suspenders, built with cable-
based excavating apparatus, material conveyance systems, or made feasible by cable
supported elevators, owed some debt to wire rope. A significant amount of the wire used
in these prominent symbols ofAmerican engineering was produced at the facilities ofthe
John A. Roebling's Sons Company (JARSCO).
John A. Roebling is often acknowledged as the first manufacturer ofwire rope in
America, which he began to produce on his western Pennsylvania farm in the early
1840s. To expand his business, John Roebling established a wire drawing and wire rope
manufacturing plant in Trenton, New Jersey, and built a reputation for engineering by
pioneering the application ofwire rope to long-span suspension bridge building. After
John's death in 1869, his sons Washington, Ferdinand, and Charles increased both the
output and range ofproducts manufactured in their Trenton plant, and incorporated the
John A. Roebling's Sons Company in 1876. By the tum of the century, corporate
consolidations in the steel industry convinced the Roebling brothers that onsite steel
production was imperative for their company's survival. In 1904, ten miles south of
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Trenton on the Delaware River, the Roeblings began construction of a new wire facility,
the Kinkora Works, with an integrated steel mill. The Kinkora Works signaled the
Roeblings' intent to compete with the US Steel Company and end their dependence on
outside sources of steel. Fueled by the added wire production ofKinkora, the Roeblings
were able to keep pace with the vast new markets for wire and wire rope created by the
growth in turn-of-the-century construction, revolutions in transportation technologies,
and demands of two world wars. This thesis examines how Kinkora represented a
response to the growth of oligopoly in the steel industry - an attempt to maintain private,
family ownership of a steel and wire company in a rapidly changing industrial and
corporate world. I focus rather narrowly on how manufacturing technologies and
products impacted the relationship between management, labor, and engineering at the
Kinkora Works; yet underlying the technological developments that shaped wire making
at Kinkora were fundamental changes - the mechanization ofmanufacturing, the
increasing role of scientific research and development, and the displacement of skilled
labor - that affected early twentieth-century American industrymore broadly.
1.0 THE ROEBLING COMPANY AS A "BRIDGE" FIRM
The Roebling Company does not fit easily into the classifications established by business
historiography to analyze the corporate character of the United States in the first halfof
the twentieth century. In the early years ofthe twentieth century, the Roebling company
seemed to possess all the traits of a major industrial enterprise. By 1911, the Roebling
company operated wire making facilities that were vertically integrated from its Kinkora
steel mill to regional sales outlets, constructed its own worker village, and boasted of
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operating one of the largest wire mills in the United States. Roebling catalogs advertised
several hundred types ofwire and wire rope products, many in direct competition with
those ofthe American Steel & Wire Company owned by the industry giant US Steel. Yet
several typically nineteenth-century modes ofoperation persisted at the JARSCO well
into the next century. From the company's incorporation in 1876 to its sale in 1953,
ownership and management rested in the hands of the Roebling family. The company
remained a relatively small scale, independent steel maker in an era of corporate
consolidations and conglomerations.! Furthermore, although not as pervasively as in the
earlier century, the Roeblings allowed their workers, particularly in the wire mills, to
retain a certain measure of traditional shop floor control until WWII.
Assessing the place ofthe Roebling Company as either big or small business has
significance for understanding the variety of forms industrial evolution in America took
in the twentieth century. A ready framework for this assessment lies in both well
established theories of industrial change and more recent work in small business history.
For modernization of large scale operations, Alfred Chandler, Jr.'s benchmark studies of
the hierarchically organized corporations and managerial capitalism has provided a point
of departure for further analysis ofbig business. According to Chandler, the most
dominant companies successfully invested in three critical areas: production facilities
large enough to exploit economies of scale and scope; purchasing, marketing, and
!The Roebling Company could produce about 150,000 tons ofwire and 150,000
tons ofwire rods, compared to the American Steel &Wire Company's capacity for
1,577,000 tons ofwire and 1,455,000 tons ofwire rods in 1907. The American Iron and
Steel Association, Directory to the Iron and Steel Works ofthe United States
(philadelphia: The American Iron and Steel Association, 1908),50, 121.
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distribution networks; and recruitment of a force of salaried managers to oversee
departmentalized production? Andrew Carnegie's management of Carnegie Steel
perhaps best represented the efficacy of Chandler's formula for garnering substantial
control in an industry. In general, the steel industry proved readily amenable to
modernization and reorganization through the investment criteria described by Chandler.
Ofprimary concern for the history ofthe Roebling Company was the role of technology,
which was central in generating "first mover" advantages, throughput gains, and
economies of scale that were crucial to fostering the structural changes that typified
Chandler's modem industrial enterprise.
Despite the influence of Chandler's work, a number ofhistorians believed its
focus on the major corporations implicitly, at least, downplayed the role of small
businesses in the U.S. economy. Several localized studies of regional industries and
individual companies found that Chandler's analysis of large companies did not apply to
the larger spectrum of strategies employed by smaller businesses to survive or gain
modest growth. In a historiographic essay for the Business History Review, Mansel
Blackford noted a renewed interest in smaller contributors to the U.S. economy coincided
with troubled times for prominent corporations and the resurgence of small businesses in
the late 1970s and 1980s.3 Several works relevant to the Roebling history dealt with the
unique set of factors facing family-run enterprises, the efficacy of finding market niches,
and manufacturing alternatives to mass production.
2Alfred Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics ofIndustrial Capitalism
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1990),4-9.
3Mansel G. Blackford, "Small Business in America: A Historiographic Survey,"
Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 6-7.
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In Chandler's scheme, the development of the organizational capabilities needed
to expand in the twentieth-century corporate environment precluded the continuation of
an older set ofbusiness values usually connected with family ownership. The
progression of the steel industry in the twentieth century toward corporate ownership
seemed to guarantee extinction for family-run steel companies, yet the Roeblings resisted
a corporate buyout until 1953. In the past decade, a focus on the family business has
emerged in both institutional form, the Family Business Review, and histories that explore
how the varied goals of family ownership brought certain advantages that
counterbalanced other drawbacks. Matthew Roth noted in his history of the Platt
Brothers and Company that family businesses often accepted slow or no growth strategies
when principles oflong term survival overrode expansion and short term profits. At the
Platt Brothers and Company, family management instilled a commitment to tradition that
enabled the zinc fabricators to weather adversity, and the more direct lines of decision
making provided aflexibility to adapt to changing speciality marketopportunities.4 In
many respects, labor relations at Platt Brothers and Company reflected the "industrial
personalism" that Philip Scranton found pervasive in specialty manufacturing or ''batch''
production firms. Because specialty firms often contended with a high degree of
irregularity and uncertainty in demand, such companies required flexible employment
policies that shielded key personnel in economic downswings through selective layoffs
and by cutting working hours and wages. These contingencies, Scranton suggests,
"regularly gave rise to industrial personalism, practices based on shared assumptions
4Matthew Roth, Platt Brothers & Company (Hanover: University Press ofNew
England, 1994),208-211.
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about right and 'manly' behavior that blended respect and reciprocity while leaving room
for deference with dignity."s In some cases, industrial personalism evinced labor
relations of an earlier era. In a study of wrought iron manufacturer A.M. Byers, Michael
Santos found the family owners allowed their workers to maintain a more traditional
control of the shop floor, and even unionize, to perpetuate a simpler system ofmanagerial
control. In contrast to the familiar story told ofmass production industries where
mechanization ofproduction processes often prompted organizational changes and
displaced skilled labor, at A. M. Byers, "changes in production techniques were not
accompanied by changes in managerial structure and goals, as they had been at the
corporations in the economic mainstream, and workplace relations remained largely
unchanged.,,6
The survival ofA.M. Byers and the Platt Brothers and Company in the metals
industry depended on finding and securing niche markets. The viability of specialty
manufacturers, offering products that often complemented mass markets, has been
documented by Philip Scranton and other historians of small businesses, including James
SoUow, John Ingham, and Jeremy Atack,7 Scranton's recent work, Endless Novelty:
Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925, examines in detail the
SPhilip Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible Production and American
Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 1991): 45.
6Michael W. Santos, "Laboring on the Periphery: Managers and Workers at the
A.M. Byers Company, 1900-1956," Business History Review 61 (Spring 1987): 127.
7Jarhes Soltow, "Origins of Small Business: Metal Fabricators and Machinery
Makers in New England, 1890-1957"; John Ingham, Making Iron and Steel: Independent
Mills in Pittsburgh, 1820-1920 (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1991); Jeremy
Atack, Estimations ofEconomies ofScale in Nineteenth-Century United States
Manufacturing (New York: Garland Publishers, 1985).
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variegated contributions of the manufacturers operating outside the sphere ofmass
production and managerial capitalism to the U.S. economy. Building on themes
developed in earlier works, Scranton divides the production of goods into four broad
approaches: custom, batch, bulk, and mass production. Custom work involved items
"individually crafted for a purchaser, made singly to discrete specifications," whereas
batch goods "were made in lots ofvaried size, often on the basis of aggregated advance
orders," such as machine tools, precision instruments, and musical instruments. Bulk
manufacturing utilized a relatively lower level of skilled labor and simpler technologies
to produce staple goods in large quantities, "relying on cost-saving efficiencies to realize
profits from markets filled with essentially identical goods." Barbed and plain wire,
window glass, and chains could be counted as bulk goods. Mass production, commonly
associated with the Ford assembly-line and the heavy steel industry, required substantial
investment of capital and engineering resources in routinized manufacturing equipment
and processes for high volume, standardized items.8
Such categories are neither exclusive nor rigidly prescriptive -- companies like
GE and Westinghouse, which combined different approaches to manufacturing,
constituted mixed format or "bridge" firms. To Scranton, such attempts "by very large
firms to bridge several formats are especially intriguing, because they originated at both
batch- and bulk- oriented companies and created complex organizational contingencies."9
Because the concept of "bridge firni" applies particularly well to the Roebling company, I
8Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American
Industrialization, 1865-1925 (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 10-12.
9Scranton, Endless Diversity, 28.
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use Scranton's analysis to illustrate how wire manufacturing at Roebling involved aspects
ofcustom, batch, bulk, and mass production.
The Roebling Company dwelt in the worlds ofboth large:-scale mass production,
big industry and specialty manufacturing, small business. As an independent steelmaker,
the company had opportunities for growth that existed outside the oligopoly, and the
Roebling history allows a look at how technology influenced the structure of industry
from a new perspective, one that incorporates the unlikely combination of steel, family
ownership, and mass and specialty production. Through close coordination and control
of engineering, finances, and labor relations, the Roebling owners constructed a
technological system ofwire making that successfully bridged the regimes ofbatch and
mass production. Ultimately, the viability of this technological system was compromised
by the introduction of standardized equipment and continuous manufacturing
technologies that eroded advantages of specialty production. The addition of a steel mill
in 1904 initiated a transition toward mass production that culminated in the installation of
continuous wire drawing machines just prior to the Second World War. Overthis period,
the increasing investment in mass production technologies benefitted specialty goods as
well, but was better suited to full-run, large-volume products. Traditional labor relations
based on industrial personalism became outmoded, and executive management began to
adopt mainstream corporate practices in investment and outlook. The experience of a
company that bridged mass and specialty production suggests that while a confluence is
possible, separate spheres of strategies function for each mode, strategies that are
inextricably linked to technological choices.
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2.0 THE TECHNOLOGIES OF CONSOLIDATION
Business historian Alfred Chandler Jr. labeled the building wave ofmergers and
consolidations that had reshaped American industry since the 1880s "the most important
single episode in the evolution of the modem industrial enterprise in the United States."IO
The formation of the United States Steel Corporation in 1901, America's first ''billion
dollar company," culminated trends that in part had been sparked by developments in the
U.S. wire industry during the last decade of the nineteenth century. Since 1880, the
desire to ensure a predictable and profitable market for wire goods and to gain economies
of scale acted as forces of consolidation in the wire industry. Both forces were closely
tied to technical developments relating to the emergence ofBessemer steel, barbed wire,
and wire nails.
The first widely adopted method ofmass producing steel was the pneumatic
process developed by Sir Henry Bessemer in the 1850s. In a seven to ten minute scene of
great violence, the Bessemer converter forced air through molten pig iron, raising the
bath temperature through the reaction ofoxygen and the carbon in the iron to produce
steel. The Bessemer process dramatically reduced the time, expense, and skilled labor
involved in steel making from earlier methods. Because the hot charge ofmolten pig iron
required by the Bessemer convertor encouraged integration with a blast furnace, high
capital costs discouraged new competitors from entering the steel industry. Steel
companies with integrated blast furnace/Bessemer works found it most economical to
keep their blast furnaces in constant operation to avoid costly and nonproductive start-up
procedures, which in tum pressured the salesmen to secure large outlets for ingots, rolled
IOChandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics ofIndustrial Capitalism, 79.
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merchant bars, billets, and rails. Between 1870 and 1900, much ofthe production from
the largest steel concerns such as Carnegie Steel, Jones & Laughlin, and Federal Steel
was channeled towards two primary consumers, railroads and finishing mills that rolled
steel into plates, hoops, tubes, and wire rods. Other major steel manufacturers sought
more specialized markets to avoid ruinous competition with Carnegie's rail mills, as
Bethlehem Iron (later Bethlehem Steel) did by pursuing defense contracts in armor plate
and gun steel.
Looking back on the nineteenth-century conditions in the steel industry that led to
the formation ofUnited States Steel, a 1911 government report affirmed this rough
division of steel companies into two camps: primary or "semi-finished" steel
manufacturers, and secondary manufacturers or "finishers."!! Primary steel concerns
depended on secondary consumers, including the wire rod mills, to purchase large
amounts ofsteel ingots and billets. In the late 1890s, this uneasy and tenuous
relationship was upset by the intention of leading finishers, such as the American Wire &
Steel Company and National Tube, to begin manufacturing the steel ingots and billets
normally purchased from Carnegie's group. Steps taken toward backward integration by
the finishers provoked Carnegie who responded in kind by drawing up plans to build a
finishing mill of enonnous capacity at Conneaut Harbor, Ohio. Newspapers and trade
journals recognized the ensuing battle between primary and secondary companies would
result in enonnous enlargement of overall capacity, and undermine existing quasi-
monopolies in certain fields such as tubes, plain wire, and steel hoops and send those
!!Report ofthe Commissioner ofCorporations on the Steel Industry, Part I
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), 100.
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firms on shaky financial ground into bankruptcy or sale.12 Facing the unsettling prospect
of ruinous competition, steel industrialists and bankers turned to combination as a means
of stabilizing markets and profits -- the resulting US Steel Corporation amalgamated
several leading primary and secondary companies, including the American Steel & Wire
Company, itself a product of earlier mergers.
Highly capitalized steel interests had previously tried several methods to avoid the
reoccurring threat of competition for mass markets - the combination solution followed
a pattern set earlier in the wire industry. To the commentators ofthe day, the leading role
that individuals played in this consolidation was clear: "the rapid changes which have
. taken place in the wire industry during the past few years, and particularly during the last
year, have been due to the efforts of a small group ofmen."l3 This group included John
Gates, who had entered the wire industry initially as a salesman of the product that fenced
the west, barbed wire. The great demand by ranchers and farmers for barbed wire, and
the relatively low-capital entry costs made the barbed wire business an attractive prospect
for many. In 1880, it was reported that as little as $10,000 could fund a stock ofwire, a
barbed wire machine, and a small workforce needed to enter the barb wire business, if
only on a small scale. In his examination ofthe formation of the American Steel & Wire
Company, Joseph McFadden observed that most of these early small barbed wire
companies "were actually processors, since their manufacturing activity did not include
wire production, including only barbing or arming ofplain wire previously purchased
12Ibid., 104.
l3Iron Age (March 23, 1899).
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from a wire rod mill.,,14 Similar to barbed wire, other wire products such as wire nails
and wire cloth used a readily available raw material, such as plain (and later galvanized)
wire, and a relatively simple and cheap, machine-driven manufacturing process for a
mass market. Machines to manufacture nails from plain wire were introduced almost
concurrently with barbed wire machines, providing a quicker, less expensive alternative
to the traditional process ofcutting nails from sheets. As a result, competition among the
barbed wire and wire nail manufacturers led to wide price fluctuations, followed by
declines in prices and profits.15 Some manufacturers tried to use patent rights to combat
the instability ofnail and barbed wire markets. Owners of the original Glidden patent on
barbed wire found it difficult to enforce, as many "moonshiners" sold bootleg barbed
wire to consumers on remote frontier ranches. Industry leaders turned next to informal
pricing agreements and price pools, although the nail pool in 1892 and wire rod pool in
1897 proved too vulnerable to competing interests among its members to remain
effective. Despite the failure of the price pools, steel industry leaders recognized the
importance ofwire rods as the key to controlling the wire industry. Wire manufacturers
usually purchased rods, or less often, rolled them from billets, bars, or blooms provided
by rolling mills. Because successful wire drawing depended upon the quality ofthe
process that preceded it (and therefore depended on high quality rods for superior wire),
the wire industry was particularly susceptible to tariffs or attempts to control the price of
rods or billets. In 1897, only twelve companies rolled rods for manufacturing wire,
14Joseph M. McFadden, "Monopoly in Barbed Wire: The Formation ofThe
American Steel and Wire Company," Business History Review 52 (Winter 1978): 467.
15Ibid., 470.
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barbed wire, or wire nails. That year the Iron Age followed with great interest the
developing attempt to comer the production ofwire rods:
Unless our sources of information are seriously at fault, the output ofwire
rods in this country has been cornered.... The control of the rod market
has long been in contemplation. Various schemes have been attempted,
but hitherto without success. It was an inviting field for those who desired
to secure better prices for wire and wire products, as the manufacturers are
so few in number and the construction of an up-to-date rod mill is so
costly an undertaking that competition is not to be feared very seriously.
But in endeavoring to effect a combination among rod manufacturers, the
diversity of interests always defeated such schemes.16
Through the efforts of two engineer/mechanics in the United States, Charles Morgan and
William Garrett, the mechanization ofrod rolling had made great strides in the late
nineteenth century, securing economies of scale for rolling wire rods and appreciably
increasing the capital costs ofmanufacturing wire rods. Although the wire rod pool
dissolved in the summer of 1897, John Gates envisioned another means of controlling
wire rods, and therefore wire prices, through the horizontally integrated trust that he had
successfully used in 1892 to form the Consolidated Steel and Wire Company. After
Gates' initial attempt at a larger combination ofwire and wire rod companies fell through
when IP. Morgan deferred on underwriting the merger, Gates organized a smaller wire
trust that included six wire and wire nail companies. Gates and his industrialist colleagues
began negotiations to expand this trust, ultimately founding the American Steel & Wire
Company ofNew Jersey (AS&WC) in 1899 which controlled 96% ofbarbed wire
production and all the patents pertaining to its manufacture, and a sizeable percentage of
16The twelve companies included Washburn & Moen Mfg., Kilmer Mfg.,
Consolidated Steel & Wire, New Castle Wire Nail, Oliver Wire, Pittsburgh Wire,
American Wire, Cleveland Rolling Mill, HP Nail, American Wire Nail, Illinois Steel, and
the John A. Roebling's Sons. Iron Age (May 27, 1897):14.
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all other wire products including wire nails. 17 The formation of the AS&WC showed that
cheaper products, with sensitivities to economies of scale and mass markets, were
particularly well suited to monopolistic or oligopolistic control. Products such as wire
nails, barbed wire, and woven wire fence were conducive to mechanized production and
required less skill to manufacture -- a combination that encouraged competition and
market instabilities. Leading wire companies sought to forge a more predictable and
structured market by controlling the supply of the raw materials through combination and
raising the capital costs of entry with backward integration.
During the last decades ofthe nineteenth century, a period of tumultuous change
for the wire industry, the Roeblings felt the pull ofboth the forces of oligopoly and
independent ownership. As a leading wire manufacturer, the Roebling Company shared
the same concern for stable prices that motivated Gates and other industrialists to attempt
to minimize competition. The Roeblings actively participated in the wire pool
negotiations, and Iron Age listed the company among those included in Gates's first
attempt to organize the AS&WC. Although the Roebling brothers seriously
contemplated joining the oligopoly, the familial structure of ownership prevented the sale
of the company when the brothers could not agree on the terms. According to Roebling
historians Clifford Zink and Dorothy Hartman, when Ferdinand Roebling discovered he
would have no position in the new corporation, he raised the asking price to a prohibitive
level. I8 Washington Roebling recalled in his memoirs that his own/violent opposition
r
. /
17Iron Age (January 12, 1899): 26; and McFadden, "Monopoly in Barbed Wire,"
466.
18C1ifford Zink and Dorothy White Hartman, Spanning the Industrial Age
(Trenton: Trenton Roebling Community Development corporation, 1992),87.
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prevented the sale. 19 In either case, the buyout offer showed one example of the self
interest and personality conflicts that were characteristic of the Roeblings' business
decisions. Interestingly, the Roeblings' major competitor in the wire and wire rope
business, Washburn & Moen ofWorehester, Massachusetts, sold out to Gates and joined
the AS&WC in 1899. Resisting absorption by the American Steel & Wire Company
excluded the Roebling Company from trends such as the reduction of family control, the
inclusion of financial institutions in the board of directors, and the nascent organization
ofmanagerial hierarchies taking form as a result of industrial consolidations.20 By
retaining family ownership of the company, the Roebling brothers faced an unusual
business horizon in the new century, one that entailed personal control over the direction
and shape ofthe technological system ofmanufacturing wire products, yet faced with
new competition from vertically integrated industrial giants. Their vision of success in the
changing environment was manifested in the plans for a new wire making facility at
Kinkora, N.J. Kinkora represented a dual strategy of adding mass production capabilities
in addition to securing improved control over their existing niche manufacture ofhigh
carbon rope and bridge wire. Aside from providing the means ofincreasing production,
the new plant added two significant dimensions to the Roebling enterprise: on-site steel
making capabilities and a company village for housing the plant workforce.
The decision to integrate backwardly into steel production and compete against
the US Steel wire divisions was made feasible by the company's excellent financial
19Hamilton Schuyler, The Roeblings: A Century ofEngineers, Bridge-builders,
and Industrialists (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1931), 352.
2°Chandler, Scale and Scope, 80, 85.
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position and existing manufacturing base. The booming wire and wire rope business that
accompanied the rapid electrification and growth of telegraphy and telephony in America,
combined with shrewd investments in related industries, such as Otis Elevator and mining
companies, and bond purchases in municipal bridge and cable car projects enabled the
Roeblings to build new facilities without ever borrowing money. Although John
Roebling's primary interest lay in bridge building, after his death in 1869 his sons
Washington, Ferdinand, and Charles greatly increased both the output and range of
products manufactured in their Trenton, N.J. plant. The Roeblings advertised their
company as suppliers of all types ofwire products, from barbed wire to insulated copper
wire for electrical purposes. The success ofthe expanded product line evinced several of
the "first mover" advantages identified by Chandler; however, his first movers, the
"pioneers or other entrepreneurs who made the three interrelated sets of investments in
production, distribution, and management required to achieve the competitive advantages
of scale, scope, or both, inherent in the new and improved products and processes,"
generally achieved such advantages in conjunction with the development of
organizational capabilities more characteristic ofrationalized, hierarchical management
systems?l In contrast, the Roeblings gained first mover advantages through a unique
division ofresponsibilities among the brother-owners: Charles handled engineering issues
related to manufacturing; Ferdinand controlled marketing and financial decisions; and
Washington retained a significant voice in the decision-making process but played a
lesser day to day role because ofhis incapacitation resulting from contracting the bends
21Ibid., 35.
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during construction ofthe Brooklyn Bridge. Charles's direct role in designing
equipment, supervising the manufacturing processes, and purchasing supplies provided a
flexibility to pursue a variegated product line. The company responded quickly to new
and vast demands for galvanized wire, telegraph wire,barbed wire, and copper wire, and
adroitly made the transition from diawing iron to steel. The capabilities rested largely on
the links between the highly skilled immigrant labor,22 engineering, and management that
centered on the figure of Charles Roebling. Charles's engineering skills were
complemented by Ferdinand's business acumen. Despite a few misguided ventures,
including investment in a fraudulent electric lightbulb company, on the whole, Ferdinand
proved an astute judge ofprofitable markets and developed a nationwide network of
distribution outlets by the end ofthe nineteenth century. He organized exhibitions at the
Philadelphia Centennial and Chicago Columbian Exposition that capitalized on the
association ofthe Roebling name with the Brooklyn Bridge (despite the fact the Roebling
Company had little involvement in the project) currently under construction, and
produced detailed catalogues and wire rope handbooks to advertise the Roebling products
and expertise.23
As the turn of the century approached, the Roeblings' pursuit ofcertain markets
22In the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the Roeblings relied largely
on German rod rollers, English wire drawers, and Swedish iron and steel workersto
manufacture high quality wire. .
23Although John A. Roebling provided the initial design for the Brooklyn Bridge
and his son Washington Roebling directed construction as chief engineer, the bridge wire
contract was awarded to J. Lloyd Haigh ofBrooklyn, New York. Washington actually
sold his shares of stock in the Roebling Company to prevent impairing his brothers'
chance at gaining the contract by a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, under questionable
circumstances, Haigh won the bid. David McCullough engagingly covers the wire
contract controversy in The Great Bridge (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972),372-96.
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reflected the changing structure of the wire industry. As mentioned earlier, the Roeblings
initially touted their company as a source of all kinds ofwire products. In the products
most affected by the consolidation of the industry, such as wire nails, barbed wire, and
copper wire, the Roeblings began to see profit margins shrink. The company eventually
abandoned nails and barbed wire, and never realized significant profits from copper wire
either. The Roeblings responded to the loss ofthese mass markets by establishing
subsidiary divisions to manufacture specialty products such as woven wire cloth,
insulated wire and cable, and the Roebling "Fire-Proof' Construction Company. To
Scranton, such diversification into alternative finished goods exemplified the common
strategy of"profusion" employed by batch manufactures. Profusion, by Scranton's
definition, refers to "the capacity to create a wide range of intermediate or final goods and
the strategy of amassing sufficient lumps of diverse demand to keep the works going or
expanding."24 The Roeblings' primary avenue ofprofusion looked to the past, as they
renewed a connection with long-span suspension bridges by obtaining the contract to
supply and erect the bridge wire for the Williamsburg Bridge to Manhattan in 1898.
3.0 BRIDGE WIRE, WIRE ROPES AND SPECIALTY PRODUCTION
When John A. Roebling devised a crude wire rope in 1840 to replace the hemp
ropes used to haul canal boats up inclined planes, he introduced a technology that proved
to be a defining force governing the shape of the future Roebling enterprise. The wire
that comprised John Roebling's early ropes had long been manufactured for a variety of
uses, including chain mail and card wire used in the textile industry, but his primary
24Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity," 34.
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concern centered on the emerging application ofwire to bridge construction.
Roebling emigrated to the U.S. in 1831 from Prussia with two advantages that
would serve him well in the future: a technical education difficult to obtain in a country
with few engineering schools and exposure to recent trends in European civil
engineering. Roebling applied his training as an engineer and knowledge ofwire rope
making to bridges, pioneering several methods of construction and engineering many of
the early suspension bridges in America, including the Lackawaxen Aqueduct and the
Niagara and Cincinnati bridges. His role in the celebrated Brooklyn Bridge project was
cut short in 1869 by a fatal injury suffered while surveying the site, but the Roebling
Company's manufacture and erection of the wire cables in seventeen major bridge
projects, including the Williamsburg, Manhattan, George Washington, and Golden Gate
bridges continued an association with bridge building that lasted well into the twentieth
century.
Bridge wire called for exacting standards ofmanufacture. Prior to the Brooklyn
Bridge, expensive wrought iron (later high carbon steel) was primarily used for the wire
that had to sustain the weight of the bridge deck, variable loading from wind and traffic,
and resist corrosion from the elements. John Roebling initially relied on outside sources,
largely imported English wire, for many ofhis bridges because wire of the necessary
quality and quantity was not available in the United States. Bridge wire was a specialized
product in several respects. As steel gained wider use in wire drawing, bridge
applications required a relatively large diameter, high quality, high carbon steel wire with
ductility, hardness, and tensile strength characteristics that had very limited use in other
applications. Manufacturing bridge wire involved specialized cleaning, heat treatment,
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and galvanizing processes employed for only certain products in the Roebling line. The
Roeblings sought to improve their position in bridge bids by coupling cable erection with
supplying bridge wire. Washington Roebling's previous.experience in bridge work, most
notably on the Brooklyn Bridge, and the company's familiarity with specialized splices,
fasteners, connectors, and handling wire proved an effective combination. The success of
the Bridge Division set a precedent in the wire industry and bridge construction that was
later followed by US Steel.
Prior to bridge wire, the Roeblings achieved profusion through another specialty
product, wire rope. John Roebling's pioneering work in wire rope led to an early
domination of the U.S. wire rope market, and his sons perpetuated this control through
patents on methods and equipment pertaining to wire rope manufacturing, and the
construction wire rope machines ofunique sizes and capacities.25 Aggressive advertising
and boosting ofdifferent types ofwire ropes for use in power transmission systems, cable
cars, and marine applications resulted in demand that taxed the capacity ofthe Roeblings'
Trenton facilities.
A wide variety ofwire ropes were developed to best match the many uses
surfacing in industrializing America. Wire could be stranded in a wide assortment of
patterns tailored for general or specific uses. A Roebling wire rope handbook classified
wire rope as "a machine composed of a number ofprecise, moving parts, designed and
25Some historians estimated the Roeblings produced nearly 100% of the wire rope
made in the United States before 1880. Zink and Hartman, Spanning the Industrial Age,
75.
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manufactured to bear a very definite relation to one another.,,26 By changing the quality
and size of the steel wire, the "lay" of the wire, and the core, rope flexibility, durability,
and strength could be widely varied to suit applications from elevator cables to airplane
control cords. Depending on the use, wire rope could be manufactured to custom orders,
or made in batch and bulk quantities.
Despite an increasing demand for wire rope in the early decades of the twentieth
century, the complexities ofmanufacturing quality wire rope discouraged potential
competitors. Even during a production crisis brought by World War I that initiated a
government-sponsored cooperative organization ofthe wire industry, a Roebling
publication listed only seven manufactures ofwire rope (with a significant percentage of
production divided between two concerns, the Roebling Company and the American
Steel & Wire Company).27
While bridge wire and wire rope seemed to qualify as specialized, or "batch"
products, ultimately both shared a lineage with common plain wire. Well into the
twentieth century, the basic stages ofmanufacturing all types ofwire had remained
relatively static over the preceding three hundred years. Except for its steam power
source, the first wire drawing bench in Trenton differed little from seventeenth-century
equipment used to draw wire. In essence, the basic process consisted ofpulling a metal
rod through a die, th,us reducing the cross sectional area and correspondingly elongating
the rod. The rod or wire was paid off from spools or "swifts" and pulled through a die
26John A. Roebling's Sons Company, Roebling Wire Rope Handbook,
unpublished engineering manual, 1944.
27JoOO A. Roebling's Sons Company, Wire Roping the German Submarine
(Trenton: John A. Roebling's Sons Company, 1920).
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and wound by a driven cylindrical "block." Until electric motors gained wider use after
the turn of the century, a central steam engine typically powered the blocks through a set
ofbelts, drive trains, and gears. The wire was stripped from the block by hand, and
placed on a new swift feeding a block with a smaller die if further drawing was necessary.
Repetition ofthis procedure, commonly called "a draft," further reduced the cross
sectional area to the desired size. A skilled wire drawer typically handled from six to
eight "single draft" machines at any given time. Improvements in gearing, dies, and
motive force advanced the productivity ofwire drawing, but until continuous (multi-
draft) drawing machines replaced the venerable single draft units, few economies of scale
could be realized in the wire mills. Increasing production capacity required the
installation of additional single draft machines and the concomitant hiring ofskilled
attendants. For this reason, a large number ofwire drawing companies, mostly small
concerns, continued to exist and fill niche markets with wire products in the twentieth
century.
4.0 THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TWO-SPHERE PRODUCTION SYSTEM
The Roebling Company located their headquarters in Trenton, where construction
of their first wire drawing facility began in 1848. The Roeblings' Trenton facilities, the
site of several nineteenth- and twentieth-century wire drawing innovations, have a rich
history of their own that would add to several studies that document the significance of
Trenton as an early center of industry in the United States. This thesis, however,
concentrates on the Kinkora Works, built ten miles south ofTrenton near Florence
Township in 1904, because Kinkora marked the commitment of the Roeblings to a "two
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sphere production system": a system that implemented strategies ofboth mass and niche
market production. On one hand, Kinkora reflected the increasing rationalization,
mechanization, and systematization typical ofthe wire and steel industry; on the other,
the success of the system designed at Kinkora depended on the skill of a chief
engineering designer, skilled attendants and engineers, many rule ofthumb practices, and
traditional worker control of several key processes, including wire drawing, cleaning, and
heat treatment.
The site layout and selection of technologies emphasized optimum flexibility,
control, and efficiency, reflecting the progressive rationalization oftechnological systems
in early twentieth-century American industry. The farmland purchased for the new plant
presented the Roebling system builders with a clean slate. Unimpinged by city growth,
the experience of fifty years ofmanufacturing wire rope could be tangibly expressed in
the Kinkora Works. Because the giant 30 ton and 80 ton rope machines built by Charles
Roebling to strand wire into wire rope were too heavy and cumbersome to move from
Trenton, the Roeblings dedicated the Kinkora facility to primarily making wire that
would be sold in coils or finished as rope, insulated wire, or flat wire at Trenton. The
Delaware River front property provided an easy accessto barge traffic, and ensured a
ready supply for the large quantities ofwater needed to make steel. Severaloutfalls
spilled plant wastes into the river, and the Roeblings used their riparian rights to expand
the property by dumping slag from the steel mill along the river front to provide
foundations for future buildings.
Characteristic ofmany turn ofthe century industries, site layout emphasized
process flow efficiency and future expansion. Considering the scale ofKinkora, the debt
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owed the principle engineer, Charles G. Roebling, was substantial. Charles arranged the
location of all buildings and equipment for the plant and the village, laid out plans for
much ofthe machinery, and integrated a network ofrailroad tracks to facilitate the
transfer ofmaterials. Placement of the steel, blooming, rod, and wire mills in parallel
reflected the trend toward continuous processing on a longitudinal axis -- process flow
traveled roughly in a straight line from end to end, allowing anticipated growth to be met
by lengthwise extensions.
In contrast, the arrangement ofbuildings at Trenton had impeded efficient flow
between processes. Even property purchased there to supplement the original 1848
twenty-five acre plot afforded insufficient flexibility to accommodate the dynamic forces
shaping the wire industry in the last half ofthe nineteenth century. Much ofKinkora's
design and construction drew on lessons learned from Trenton. Charles Roebling
centrally situated a boiler and power house to provide steam and electricity for the entire
plant, alleviating the waste and inefficiency ofTrenton's scattered boilers.28 The
expansive site allowed for single-story design ofmost buildings, avoiding the fire hazards
and difficulties of transmitting power to multi-story structures that plagued the Trenton
plant. While a combination of steel and timber supported the structure ofmany Trenton
~,
mills, at Kinkora Charles used only steel construction.29 Steel as a structural material had
several advantages over timber -- it allowed a wider building design and was thought to
reduce the danger of fires.
Although Kinkora was considered a state-of-the-art facility, Trenton's
28"Improving Flexibility and Cost ofPower," Iron Age (April I?, 1924): 1141-43.
29Zink and Hartman, Spanning the Industr~alAge, 111.
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shortcomings had not provided the only inspiration. In May 1902, the Grand Crossing
Tack Company began ground breaking for a plant outside Chicago to manufacture wire,
woven fence, nails, and staples. Although the original construction included only a steel
mill, blooming mill, boiler house, and machine shop, the parallel layout of the buildings
and placement of the rail lines anticipated the Kinkora design.30 Similarly, Kinkora's
arrangement ofbuildings and equipment loosely followed that of the American Steel &
Wire Company's new Donora Works in Donora, Pennsylvania, detailed in the December
1903 issue of Scientific American.3! Although reports on new plant constructions in Iron
Age, Iron Trades Review, Engineering, and Engineering News often lagged a year or two
behind erection dates, the trade magazines illustrate Kinkora's antecedents in the wire
industry.
Underlying the generic aspects ofthe Kinkora plans, however, an orientation
toward specialty production shaped the final form of the plant. hi plants intended to draw
low carbon wire (generally used for mass market products such as nails, plain wire, and
bale ties), rod bundles usually traveled to the cleaning house before entering the wire
mills. At Kinkora, an arterial railroad line delivered rod bundles directly to the
Tempering Shop for a patenting treatment largely unique to processing high carbon wire.
The Roeblings built a large Galvanizing Shop that accommodated several galvanizing
rigs for applying a corrosion resistant coating of zinc to wire that became common
practice in specifying bridge wire after the Brooklyn Bridge.
30"Steel Plant of the Grand Crossing Tack Company," Iron Age (August 4, 1904):
16.
3!"Steel Wire and Nail Making," Scientific American 89 (December 12, 1903):
436-38.
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The steel mill design also reflected the dichotomous nature ofmass and batch
production at Roebling. Rather than build a Bessemer steel works, the Roeblings turned
to open hearth furnaces, which were fast becoming the preferred method of steelmaking.32
By 1904, most wire rod mills in the United States were rolling steel from open hearth
furnaces.33 In the open hearth process, a regenerative system of checkers preheats a
mixture of air and gasified fuel before it is burned over the charged materials. This
process creates temperatures high enough to slowly convert the iron into steel under
controlled conditions, yielding steel that was superior to that made in Bessemer
converters. The open hearth design did not require as costly or complex a step in
backwards integration as the common practice in Bessemer steel production. In the early
stages of open hearth steelmaking, operators charged the furnace with cold metal, usually
some combination ofpig iron and scrap, and heated it gradually to the proper
temperature. Since Bessemer converters required a molten charge that could be more
economically supplied by an integrated blast furnace facility, the choice of an open hearth
32Since 1880, open hearth furnaces had steadily gained acceptance in the United
States, surpassing the Bessemer converter in 1908 as the most 'favored method of
processing steel. Bela Gold, William S. Pierce, Gerhard Rosegger, and Mark Perlman,
Technological Progress and Industrial Leadership (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1984),531; and A.O. Backert, ed., The ABC ofSteel, 4th ed., (Cleveland: The Penton
Publishing Company, 1921), 133.
,33In 1904, The Directory to the Iron and Steel Works ofthe United States listed
thirty-two producers ofwire-rods. Ten of these thirty-two mills had integrated open
hearth furnaces, another twelve were owned by companies that produced their own open
hearth steel at nearby steel mills, two were planning to add open hearth furnace facilities,
and another two were idle, leaving only six companies, relatively minor members ofthe
wire-rod industry, without iron or steel making capabilities or using older methods of
making steel in 1904. See Appendix A.
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steel mill involved a substantially less drastic undertaking.34 The ability to use scrap as a
portion of the charge in open hearth furnaces particularly benefitted the wire industry.
Hot rolling ingots and rods, and wire drawing generated substantial quantities of scrap
steel, providing a local source of raw materials. Although the open hearth furnace offered
advantages for all wire mills, the improved control of the chemical composition of the
steel ingots was especially attractive to companies drawing wire for highly specialized
purposes, such as bridge or heavy duty wire. In addition to freeing the Roebling
company from the vagaries of the steel market, the open hearth allowed for exacting
control of the chemical composition so crucial to the hardness, toughness, strength,
ductility and uniformity of the end product.
The size and type of the open hearth furnaces further reflected a flexibility of
design for mass and batch production. The Kinkora plans initially specified six moderate
size furnaces of30 ton capacity. After adding three more 30 ton furnaces by 1910, the
Roebling steel mill had a sizeable total output that compared well with the Worchester
South Works ofthe American Steel & Wire Company (the former main steel facility of
Washburn & Moen), but the Roebling capacity was supplied by relatively small furnaces.
The smaller furnaces facilitated control of the heat, an important concern for making steel
of a precisely specified composition.3s Steel companies manufacturing low carbon steel
or lower quality, high volume products, were less concerned with close control of the
heat, and built larger furnaces. Furnace size had increased since the early 10 to 15 ton
open hearth furnaces of the early l890s, but unresolved problems with lining endurance,
34Gold, et aI., Technological Progress and Industrial Leadership, 537.
3s"Bridge Wire Requires Fine Steel," Iron Age (April 17, 1930): 1148..
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cooling, and crane lifting limits restrained the growth of furnace size in the first decades
of the twentieth century. Despite the technical obstacles, by the time the Roebling
furnaces became operational in 1907, some companies were seeking greater economies of
scale by building 50 ton or larger furnaces.36 Although solution of the salient technical
limitations during the 1920s initiated a period of growth in furnace size, the Roebling
Company chose to increase capacity by adding new furnaces rather than greatly enlarge
existing ones.37 Even as some furnace sizes exceeded 300 tons in 1930, the common
experience in the wire industry held that heats intended for superior quality bridge wire
should not exceed 100 tons, and the Roebling furnaces were less than half this size.
In addition to the question of size, any installation ofopen hearth furnaces posed a
question ofwhether to build basic or acid types. The "basic" or "acid" designator
referred to the chemical reactivity ofthe material used in refractory linings ofthe furnace
or converter. When Henry Bessemer developed his famous converter in the 1850s, he
fortuitously used a low phosphorous pig iron that minimized the deleterious effect of
excessively high phosphorous content in iron that embrittles steel. The silica-based
refractory bricks that lined early Bessemer containment vessels did not eliminate
phosphorous from the molten metal.38 Low carbon steels tolerate higher percentages of
36Porexample, Bethlehem Steel, Atlanta Steel Company, Colorado Puel & Iron,
and the American Steel & Wire Company built 50 ton open hearth furnaces prior to 1908.
The American Iron and Steel Association, Directory to the Iron and Steel Works ofthe
United States (philadelphia: The American Iron and Steel Association, 1908).
37Prom 1910 to 1920, the company constructed three additional furnaces. By
1930, eight of the twelve open hearth furnaces had been modestly enlarged to a capacity
of40 tons, and a double spout 80 ton ladle was installed in 1941.
38The acid character of the silica lining did not provide the free metal oxides
needed to precipitate oxidized phosphorous, therefore allowing no removal of
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phosphorous, but high carbon steels are sensitive to even 0.08 percent.39 Thomas and
Gilchrist's patent for a basic lining made from a mixture oflime and magnesia that made
phosphorous removal possible solved the "phosphorous problem," ushering in an era of
new possibilities for the use ofhigh phosphorous ore in steelmaking. Although America
possessed sizeable reserves oflow phosphorous ore well into the twentieth century,
adoption ofbasic linings in U.S. open hearth furnaces in 1892 added a flexibility with
respect to raw materials.40 While the basic process successfully reduced the ill effects of
phosphorous, it encouraged the use of a lower quality ore or pig iron that generally did
not result in a superior grade of steel. The quality ofbasic steel improved with later
developments in metallurgy; however, during the early twentieth century, companies
desiring to furnish quality high carbon products relied on acid Bessemer converters or
open hearth furnaces. The need to continue manufacturing high carbon bridge wire and
extend the product line to offer a variety oflow to medium carbon products dictated that
both basic and acid open hearth furnaces be installed at Kinkora. In short, the dual acid-
basic type arrangement afforded a high degree of flexibility: the furnaces could utilize
either coal gas, natural gas, or oil as a fuel, accept a charge ofboth iron and scrap, and
produce a wide assortment of different types of steel for both bulk and batch goods.
In other sections of the plant, most notably in the Blooming and Rod Mills,
innovative modifications, hydraulic lifting tables, charging devices, and overhead cranes
phosphorous from the molten iron.
39Harold E. McGannon, ed., The Making, Shaping and Treating ofSteel, 9th ed.,
(Pittsburgh: United States Steel, 1971),915.
4°Kenneth C. Barraclough, Steelmaking, 1850-1900 (London: Institue ofMetals,
1990),239.
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increasingly mechanized manufacturing and introduced new continuous processing
technologies that represented the latest efforts to improve productivity.41 Such
developments contributed to greater economies of scale that combined with a 233 percent
larger production capacity, enabled the Roebling Company to compete in bulk and mass
markets for wire and wire rope. WWI tested the limits ofKinkora's capacity, as myriad
needs arose for wire and wire rope during the war, providing a period ofhigh profits for
the Roeblings.42 However, unlike the assembly line commonly connected to the
emergence ofmass production in the automotive industry, mass production ofwire at
Kinkora from 1904 to 1930 retained many skilled workers and rule of thumb practices.
41See Appendix B.
42Most importantly for the Roeblings, a major percentage of the demand consisted
ofhigh carbon products. Two technologies that revolutionized warfare during World
War I, the submarine and airplane, provided a nearly unlimited demand for high carbon
wire and wire rope. To defend against the crippling threat of the submarine, the allies
developed steel nets to prevent penetration ofharbor entrances by enemy U-boats, and
devised a vast North Sea minefield to block entry into vital shipping lanes. The large
diameter, high carbon steel wire used in submarine nets required minimal reduction in
. Kinkora's wire mill number one before being woven into rectangular sections ofvarious
sizes. Wire mill number one also drew the bulk of the wire that made the JARSCO the
leading producer ofwire rope for the North Sea minefields. The North Sea mines were
kept in place by high quality, high carbon steel wire rope to prevent a failure that would
result in the surfacing of submerged mines and the potential to migrate into the path of
allied ships. Kinkora wire mills also manufactured high performance fine wire used in
aircraft stays, guys, and controls.. Orders for aircraft wire kept the fine wire mill number
two at Kinkora in nearly constant operation, producing some five million feet by 1918.
Additional demands, including both low carbon steel and copper telegraph and signal
wire, generated work for nearly every department.
In the company records, a conspicuous gap exists for the profits earned during the
war years, but enough capital was generated to finance extensive new construction at
Kinkora. Arough indication of the profitability of the wartime market can be gained from
the board of director's financial report that recorded a net profit for 1923 as
$7,508,866.01, "the best in the history ofthe Company with the exception of 1917." John
A. Roebling's Sons Company, "Index ofMinutes," Roebling Collection - Rutgers
University.
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The slow rate of innovation in wire drawing technology exhibited what historian Thomas
Hughes calls a "reverse salient," a technological bottleneck, that perpetuated traditional
practices in related processes. Because the length and speed ofwire that could be drawn
was limited by die materials, there was less need to improve the throughput capacities of
the cleaning and baking processes that preceded wire drawing. Until continuous process
technologies were adopted in all facets ofwire production, the technological system at
Kinkora moved toward mass production with several nineteenth-century modes still in
place.
5.0 LABOR RELATIONS AT KINKORA
In the first decades ofoperations at Kinkora, a wire drawer might have looked
upon his job at Roebling with satisfaction for several reasons, but the high degree of
control he held over his work environment and the home he rented from the company
undoubtably were positive fact.ors. Industrial personalism played a key role in defining
the interrelated set of expectations between wire drawers, foremen, engineers, ancillary
work crews, and management that governed work in the wire mills. Certain reciprocal
agreements that determined the distribution ofwork among the wire drawers were not
stipulated by management but evolved as a code ofmutual understanding. During a
normal production day, each wire drawer was expected to draw a certain allotment during
his shift - ifhe drew too much wire, he reduced the amount ofwire the next shift could
draw, decreasing his successor's wages that were based on the piece rate system, and
setting an unwelcome precedent in the increased output expected of each man. The wire
drawers also retained a high degree of autonomy in the production process, due in part to
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the slow rate of innovation in wire drawing technology that perpetuated traditional
practices. Except for the noise of several hundred wire benches, the Roebling wiremen
during the 1920s worked in an environment that had undergone few significant changes
in thirty years or differed much from the smaller wire mills. According to a popular 1921
manual of steel manufacturing, drawing wire was considered "an art," reinforcing the
traditional notion ofwire drawers as craftsmen. The wire drawer may have operated a
machine that appeared simple to understand, but this simplicity belied the complexity of
manufacturing a quality finished product. Wire drawers started as apprentices or
"helpers" in the wire mills.and acquired the skill of threading and loading wire onto a
block, controlling the speed and reduction of the draft, and monitoring die wear only with
substantial experience. As in many crafts, wire drawers guarded trade secrets, such as
their personal combination of lubricants used in the die boxes to reduce die friction, and
took pride in the ability to lift 150 to 250 lb. coils ofwire prior to the mechanization of
handling and stripping by overhead cranes. Because some wire required particularly
skilled drafting,·a measure ofprestige was associated with certain benches, such as the
bridge bench. The Kinkora wiremen also gained satisfaction knowing their workmanship
made vital contributions to the war effort and bridge engineering.
Those involved in cleaning, heat treating, rod rolling, or finishing operations also
found traditional skills maintained by rule of thumb practices. This is not to say
innovation stagnated in these areas, but it proceeded in a coordinated fashion, with the
cooperation of equipment operators, work crews, engineers, and in some cases, with
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upper level management directly involved in engineering process changes.43
Although the persistence of traditional practices might have minimized some
labor unrest, for an ownership intent on keeping apace of the latest developments in
manufacturing technologies, another means ofpacifying labor was needed. The
construction of a worker village to secure a loyal workforce placed the Roeblings on a
path taken by several turn-of-the-century industrialists. Capital requirements precluded
smaller manufacturers from building villages, but company-owned housing constituted a
strategy employed more by family or individually owned enterprises than corporations.
Philip.Scranton notes that, like the Roeblings, several entrepreneurs of specialized
manufacturing facilities including George Pullman,George Westinghouse, and Henry
Disston, built worker villages to implement their particular brand ofwelfare capitalism.
Other industrialists such as Milton Hershey, George Vanderbilt, and textile families like
the Whitins, Cheneys, and Drapers could also be added to this list.44
When the Roeblings decided to build a new facility, proximity to Trenton, good
transportation networks, and water availability heavily influenced site selection. Ten
miles south ofTrenton, a farm abutting the Delaware River and bounded on one side by
the tracks of the Pennsylvania Railroad fit many of the required criteria, yet its rural
location ensured that labor would not be readily available. Undaunted, the Roeblings
planned an entire community, complete with a general store, auditorium, inn, tavern, and
recreational facilities to support their industrial enterprise.
43See Appendix B.
44Budgett Meakin, Model Factories and Villages: Ideal Conditions ofLabour and
Housing (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1905).
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The village represented an answer to troubling labor problems that periodically
.interrupted the flow ofproduction at their Trenton facilities. By the turn ofthe century,
the technologies of steel wire making that made sense in terms of output, cost, and
efficiency had ramifications for the composition and skill of the workforce. Tending
open hearth furnaces operating at three thousand degrees Fahrenheit or lifting heavy coils
ofwire was a demanding environment that became the domain ofunskilled Eastern
European immigrant~ arriving at the turn of the century. In the past, skilled English and
German wire drawers and Swedish iron masters had constituted a vital component of the
JARSeO workforce, but the new scale of immigrant employment presented problematic
social concerns -- how would workers from rural backgrounds adapt to the expectations
of a modem industrial mill amidst a foreign culture? Attempts by employers to
assimilate their foreign labor frequently followed a paradoxical course; reconciling the
American concept of liberty with the desire to eliminate aspects of the worker's Old
World heritage proved a difficult task. A balance was needed between liberty and social
control, between personal freedoms and restriction.
Although born ofnecessity, the Roebling village was a form of social control that
symbolized the rationalization oflabor concerns and the desire to create a predictable
workforce free ofunion influence. In several cases detailed by other studies -- the
}>ullman experiment, the stultifying financial stipulations that characterized some mining
towns, and Ford's heavy-handed intrusion into the personal lives ofhis workforce -- the
balance swung disproportionately to the advantage of the corporate employer.45 The
45Stanley Buder, Pullman: an Experiment in Industrial Order and Community
Planning, 1880-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Stephen Meyer, Five
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Roeblings made no attempt to mask the purpose of the town: Roebling village was "not
designed in any sense as a Utopia, or built as the result ofphilanthropic ideals, but rather
frankly contemplated as an industrial town which was designed to pay its own way.'146
Yet in its execution, the Roebling plan for the village managed to reasonably equalize the
benefits sought by employer with those granted the employee. The provision of a
hospital, considerable recreational facilities, parks, and a home ownership association
reflected a real concern for the quality oflife of the Roebling workers. The construction
of substantial brick houses equipped with "the usual conveniences" deviated from the
small, shoddy clapboard houses of some company townS.47 Maintenance crews repainted
and wallpapered the homes every three years, made repairs, and landscaped the village
free ofcharge.48 The company built an elementary school, library, paid for town taxes
and the salaries of the police and firemen, and rented the houses at rates well below those
ofthe surrounding area.49 Even when the Depression revealed the deep inadequacies of
corporate socialism, JARSCO used the village to aid its workforce by extending credit in
Dollar Day: Labor Management and Social Control in the Ford Motor Company, 1908-
1921 (Albany: State University ofNew York. 1981)
46Schuyler, The Roeblings, 372. This business pragmatism resonated in several of
the industrialists identified by Budgett Meakin in his study ofmodel company towns. An
executive at the Reeves Engine Company wrote oftheir attempts toprovide the very best
conditions for their workers: "we can get a better grade ofmen, who are able to do finer
work and more of it, by following this course." Meakin, Model Factories and Villages,
23.
47"Industrial Village on Sound Basis," Iron Age (January 1, 1924): 9-14..
48Louis Borbi, interview by author, 18 June, 1997; and John Hodson, interview by
author, 28 July, 1997.
49Zink and Hartman, Spanning the Industrial Age, 123.
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the general store and waiving rental fees for a number ofyears.50
Nevertheless, because the town provided housing for only 40 percent of the
workforce, the low rates ofrental and close proximity to work assured a waiting list that
was filled by careful selection ofreliable workers of long employment. In essence, this
assured the Roeblings of their "core" workforce when market downswings precipitated
layoffs and wage reductions. Job position detennined the size and proximity ofthe
houses to the plant, which in practice, divided the neighborhoods into ethnic enclaves that
survive to this day. Assessing the financial merit of the Roebling village, Iron Age voiced
the intent behind the Roebling brothers' construction of a company town:
Does it pay? Not in dollars and cents. As a matter of fact, the running
expenses almost exactly balance the income -- in many years creating a
deficit which the company has had to underwrite... . But it most assuredly
does pay in the larger sense. It pays in attracting men of the better kind. It
pays in promoting pennanence of employment. And hence avoiding costly
labor turnover. It pays in promoting health ofemployees, and thus
reducing absences and errors and accidents.51
The Roeblings hoped that a "Progressive Town" would ameliorate labor discontent and
secure a better workforce.
Kinkora offers an example of the development of labor relations in a two-sphere
production system. Until WWI, the direct involvement ofupper management and
engineers in designing equipment and supervising and modifying production processes
built strong ties between owners, engineers, and skilled workers, particularly wire
drawers. The industrial personalism fostered by these links extended to the workers'
broader notion ofcommunity, as long service and hard work was expected to be rewarded
50John Hodson, interview by author, 28 July, 1997.
51"Industrial Village on Sound Basis," Iron Age (January 3, 1924):14.
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by a company home. Throughout the greater part of their ownership of the worker
village, the Roeblings recognized that involvement in their workers' lives carried a
certain responsibility, and they worked to cultivate a mutually beneficial interdependency
ofcompany and community by providing for recreation, education, comfort, and health.
Ifviewed as a means ofpreventing unionization, the village was a success: unions failed
to organize Roebling workers until 1941. In addition to fostering a sense of industrial
personalism, the village enabled the Roeblings to maintain traditional cycles ofwage
increases and decreases to match profit fluctuations, and it secured a core of critical
workers, a crucial concern for batch manufacturers.
The village, however, also had its drawbacks. Maintenance ofthe houses, stores,
utilites, and streets exacted high fixed-capital costs and managerial energies, and the
success in securing loyal, long term employees conflicted with adopting technological
innovations in mass production. Kinkora residents by design were the workers with the
greatest experience in older methods ofproduction. When newer high-throughput
technologies displaced certain skills, the company could only damage its community
relationships by terminating housing leases.
6.0 COMPANY IN TRANSITION, 1920 - 1940
Following WWI, two roughly contemporaneous developments in the steel
industry - the emergence of standardized, continuous technologies and advances made
in metallurgy and metallography - began to replace the nuanced technologies at Kinkora
with more universally used equipment and practices. The system ofwire making became
structured more by generic technology than by the design of an individual system builder
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like Charles Roebling. In particular, the construction of a new blooming mill and rod
mill, and the introduction ofcarbide die-equipped continuous wire drawing machines,
flash bakers, and straight line cleaning, marked a period of transition during the decades
between 1920 and 1940 to continuous production. This transition was never smooth, but
punctuated by technical innovation in specific areas that in some cases affected only one
mill or stage in the wire manufacturing process. Concomitantly, rule ofthumb practices
gave way to more systematic monitoring, automatically controlling manufacturing, and
scientific analysis ofproducts and processes.
For this study, the impact of the transition to mass production technologies on the
advantages of specialty production and familial ownership is ofparticular interest. First,
the move toward standardized, purchased equipment and scientific methods began to
increasingly divide ownership, engineering, and labor into separate spheres and redefine
relationships, responsibilities, and focus. Second, as mechanization sporadically
displaced skilled labor and reduced the autonomy certain skilled workers had enjoyed
with older methods ofmanufacturing, labor relations based on industrial personalism
became increasingly less appropriate and effective in the mass production workplace.
Third, keeping pace withlatest developments in bulk wire manufacturing necessitated a
commitment to high capitaltechnologies that produced the best payoffs when running at
or near full capacity. Economies of scale in wire drawing gained through the introduction
ofcontinuous wire drawing machines heightened the importance of continuous demand
for sustaining profits, a development which boded ill for the production ofbatch and
custom goods at the Roebling Company.
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6.1 Standardization and the Principles of Scientific Management
As Thomas Misa details in Nation ofSteel, Fredrick Taylor's efforts to reform factory
managment provided turri-of-the-century engineers with the beacon of"scientific
management" to shed light on inefficiencies holding back production. While some of
Taylor's methods proved ineffectual, Misa emphasizes the importance ofTaylor as giving
substance to an ideology that engineers enthusiastically adopted and interpreted as a
means to wrest control ofthe shop floor from blue collar workers. The transformation of
craft practices to standard procedures through "scientific" analysis - for example, with
appropriate testing apparatus, empirical evidence, and engineering judgement, a "cherry
red heat" became 1450 degrees Fahrenheit - empowered engineers to supercede
traditional craft knowledge.52
The shift ofcontrol over innovation in the steel and wire industry from the
mechanical experimenters and inventive tinkerers to more scientifically trained engineers
and scientists motivated by Taylor's principles proceeded rather slowly at Kinkora.
Evidence ofa more scientific approach to wiremaking at the JARSeO was first visibly
manifested in a concentrated research laboratory and the emphasis placed on rationalizing
production through increased controls and testing that made its earliest inroads in the
steel mill and heat treatment shops. Taylor's work on high speed steel, informed by his
"scientific methods," suggested several lessons that could easily apply to other steel
products undergoing heat treatment. As previously mentioned, patenting constituted a
heat treatment ofcritical importance for the Roebling high carbon products, and under
52Thomas 1. Misa, Nation ofSteel (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1995), 191,200-205.
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Charles Roebling's guidance, had followed a rather empirical and untheoretical path
toward improvement. In the late 1920s, the development of sophisticated testing and
analytical equipment played a symbiotic role in improving the metallurgical and
metallographical theories that began to elucidate the factors influencing metal hardness,
strength, ductility, and toughness. Subsequently, plant engineers required more detailed
infonnation concerning the effect oftemperature and time on the stress and strain
properties ofwire. From an early date the Roeblings had used tension testing machines
to monitor wire perfonnance, but since the 1920s, a proliferation ofnew testing apparatus
and equipment controlsin the plant testified to the greater desire to measure, record, and
tightly control processing. Between 1927 and 1928, engineering orders called for
automatic controls connected to thennocouples for billet furnaces, pyrometers on
annealing pots and open hearth furnace roofs, chemical analyzers for the steel chemistry
lab, and constant time-temperature recording instruments for the tempering ShOp.53
Although several product testing machines, such as bending testers for wire mill number
one and torsion testing machines in wire mill number two, had been incorporated in the
53As part of the work on prestressing, in 1928 the Roeblings installed the world's
largest tensioning apparatus, the Riehle Automatic Testing Machine, to apply the
enonnous loads needed to test bridge suspender wire ropes, and extensometers to
measure yield point and ultimate elongation in wire. 1928 also inaugurated a movement
toward instrument control of steel chemistry when the Roebling chemical lab purchased
an Enlund Carbon Apparatus. Later additions including the Laco Sulphur Detennination
Apparatus and a spectroscope chemical analyzer dubbed "Iron Mike," pennitted a more
precise and systematic control of steel composition that replaced earlier reliance on less
accurate methods and the melter's skill. For a description of the RiehleTesting Machine,
see "World's Largest Machine Breaks New York Bridge Cables," Iron Trade Review
(May 9, 1929): 1263. Types and installation dates ofvarious testing equipment found in
John A. Roebling's Sons Company, "Engineering Orders," Environmental Protection
Agency - Edison, New Jersey storage facility.
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mills since 1906, these technologies served more to measure the quality of the wire than
to quantify the craft skills of the wire drawers. From a manufacturing standpoint, the goal
was to provide a more uniform and consistent treatment of the steel; however,
systematizing production as dictated by the engineers tended to induce the "dissociation
ofthe labor process from the skill of the workers" that transformed craftsmen into
processors (requiring a different sort ofskill).54
Roebling engineers paid greater attention to process in part because their earlier
role as equipment designers diminished with the growing reliance on vendors for
machines that accompanied the implementation ofcontinuous technologies. Since
Charles Roebling's death in 1918, instead ofrelying on in-house design, the JARSCO
purchased much of the major equipment to update the Kinkora mills, notably the Morgan
billet reheating furnace and rod mill, the Chapman-Stein soaking pits, Westinghouse bell-
type and Lee-Wilson annealers, Morrison flash bakers, and Vaughn and Morgan-Connor
continuous wire drawing machines.55 Naturally this reflected the increasing difficulty in
sustaining an internal capacity to develop each individual component in the increasingly
sophisticated system ofmanufacturing wire - after WWI it became more practical and
cost-effective to let specialized vendors concentrate efforts on specific equipment.
Practices that had once varied as a function ofunique equipment designs assumed a more
standardized form as certain technologies found universal use in the wire industry.
Engineers involved in daily plant floor operations, who earlier had designed equipment,
54Harry Braverman,Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation ofWork in
the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
55JARSCO, "Engineering Orders, 1925-1941."
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turned to improving process efficiency and optimization of labor inputs.
The division of responsibilities between the Roebling brothers functioned
relatively well during their tenure, but as death upset the balance of executive power at
Roebling, the transfer of leadership between generations precipitated a new form of
family ownership. During the 1920s, the executive board did not experience the decline
in active family membership that Chandler described as typical ofmost large scale
enterprises in the United States, but to handle the expanded scale of operations, the
company management structure increasingly resembled a corporate, departmentalized
hierarchy.56 Separated from component design, the engineering aspect of executive
management focused on process efficiency and assessing the financial costs of adopting
new technology.
By the late 1940s, the traditional tight family control of the business had made an
uneven transition into the corporate climate ofpostwar America. The owners continued a
Roebling custom that eschewed borrowing to support expansion or plant improvements,
but as the board became dominated by family members not actively involved in the daily
operations, the character ofcompany investment changed. Zink and Hartman found that
unlike the earlier generations ofleadership, "demand for increased dividends was often
satisfied through aggressive management ofthe investment account for profit rather than
using it to promote the wire rope business or to serve as a source of company
56In June, 1921, executive directors appointed non-family members to the
Executive Committee, and established a committee to direct plant operations. The
Roeblings dissolved the Executive Committee in 1929 to implement a salaried,
hierarchical structure ofgeneral plant managers, assistant plant managers, and department
heads. John A. Roebling's Sons Company, "Promotions, Wages, and Salaries." Index of
Minutes, Roebling Collection - Rutgers University.
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financing."57 Despite allocating some $13.4 million (much of it to Kinkora) for plant
improvements in the late 1940s, the board decided the future held a decreasing likelihood
that substantial re-investment in facility upgrades would produce sufficient profits.
Withoutrecourse to the past practice of adjusting wages to balance fluctuations in
revenues due to unionization, the JARSCO began to view ownership of a plant best suited
to producing a high volume, high carbon steel product with a waning market future as an
untenable prospect. On January 1, 1953, the Roebling family sold their manufacturing
facilities to Colorado Fuel & Iron for $23 million. As the post-war owners increasingly
viewed production and manufacturing from a financially oriented perspective that was
characteristic of the post war corporate climate, mere survival or acceptance of slow
growth, goals that inspired smaller family-owned companies like the Platt Bros. &
Company, had no place at Roebling.
6.2 The erosion of industrial personalism
Ultimately, the fears ofmany Kinkora workers that mechanization would eliminate their
skilled positions materialized in several key areas. In 1928, construction ofthe new
Morgan continuous rod mill displaced the rod catchers who fed the wire rods into the
older Garrett type rod mill. Following the introduction ofcontinuous wire drawing,
straight line cleaning, and flash bakers during WWII, many cleaning and wire mill
workers found their skill and knowledge no longer applicable in the new system of
production, and their old reciprocal arrangements invalidated by the rearrangement ofthe
57Zink and Hartman, Spanning the Industrial Age, 169.
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shop floor. It is not clear ifworkers were laid offor simply found other jobs within the
company, but the displacement of the skilled wire workers occurred during a period of
labor unrest in the steel industry and union militancy. In the early 1940s, union
organizers penetrated the Roeblings' control oflabor for the first time, and a strike
followed in April 1941. The connection between the disgruntled wiremen and the
unionization of the Kinkora workers deserves further investigation, but additional factors
related to the national labor climate of the early 1940s undoubtedly played a significant
role.
Since its incorporation in 1876, the JARSCO had resisted unionization ofthe
workforce through various means: the company town ofRoebling, profit sharing plans, a
pension plan, an employee association, and company publications. Prior to unionization,
the JARSCO's practice ofweathering periods ofpoor sales by wage cuts precipitated
several strikes, but the unwillingness of the executive board to negotiate with striking
workers reflected the hardheaded, pro-business mentality of the first quarter ofthe
twentieth century that placed a premium on financial stability. The end ofthe JARSCO's
ability to mitigate losseswith wage reductions after unionization compounded the bleak
market predictions ofthe late 1940s. Moreover, the integrated steel mill had troubling
labor ramifications for the overall cost ofproduction. As Zink and Hartman point out,
strikes in 1949 and 1950 that forced the company to raise wages to the level ofthe rest of
the steel industry put the company at a disadvantage: "while regular steel production
typically required lOman-hours per ton, the labor-intensive wire rope production
required roughly 25 hours per ton. The resulting high expense ofthe company's products
weakened its competitiveness against other wire rope producers that operated under less
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expensive contracts with unions other than the United Steelworkers."s8 Unionization had
further ramifications for the traditional bond of community between management and the
workforce. Company management ofRoebling village no longer provided either an
incentive to employment or an efficacious means of controlling labor. Now a financial
liability, the JARSCO sold the houses in the Roebling village, largely to its existing
tenants, in 1947.
6.3 Mass Production, Full-run Technologies, and Market Positioning
Sale of the Roebling company to a corporate leader in the steel industry revealed the
owners' pessimistic assessment oftheir long term market position. What had happened?
Scranton argues that the demise ofcertain specialty producers such as Baldwin
Locomotive and Cramp shipyards resulted from their inability to adopt mass production
techniques. In evaluating the effect of the economic slump that followed WWI on
specialty producers, Scranton holds, "do these tales of stagnation and decline imply that
production by integrated anchors had run its course by the mid-1920s, unless practiced by
companies diversifying toward mass-market lines? Not at all. Pullman, the electrical
giants [Westinghouse and GE], Gorham, and Steinway all devised paths to profitability
while retaining their specialist capabilities."s9 Scranton could add the Roeblings to this
list of integrated anchors that turned to their batch, specialty products to support the
S8Zink and Hartman, Spanning the Industrial Age, 167.
S9Scranton, Endless Novelty, 22, 347. Scranton distinguishes between different
types of specialty manufacturers in three groups: "Integrated anchors," the giant
enterprises making the 'big stuff ofAmerica's infrastructure (locomotives, heavy
machinery) and top-of-the-line consumer goods (Steinway pianos, Gorham silver);
"networked specialists;" and "specialist auxiliaries".
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company in market downswings. In the early 1920s, the Roeblings also endured a slump
after the frenetic pace ofwartime production, and relied on its Bridge Division for new
orders. Bridge building prospects had brightened in the 1920s with the rapid expansion
of automobile ownership. The Roeblings benefitted from this new source ofbridge
demand by successfully bidding for several long-span suspension bridges.60 Bridge
projects further supported the company through the Great Depression, during which the
Roeblings obtained the contracts for the San Rafael, Golden Gate, and Tacoma Narrows
bridges. Iil addition to bridge wire, the Roeblings had historically diversified their other
specialty products to complement mass markets items, and continued this practice during
the 1940s by installing a lead tempering rig for specialty wires and a tire bead wire rig,
investing in cutting edge work in the prestressed concrete department, and establishing
the Roevar magnetic wire program in 1946 at the cost of 1.7 million dollars. The Bridge
Division's work in pioneering prestressed concrete in the United States later proved an
attractive asset that influenced Colorado Fuel & Iron's decision to buyout the owners in
1953.
Although Scranton has shown that specialty products remained an integral part of
America's industrial base, his technological model for such production was not borne out
by the Roebling experience. In terms oftheir technology, Scranton finds "batch
producers relied on 'general purpose' machinery and tools that could be adapted to
multiple tasks, rather than seeking 'dedicated' mechanisms devoted to accelerating the
60The Hudson River or George Washington (1927), Maumee River (1929), St.
John's (1929), Marysville (1930), Grand Mere (1930/1), Dome (1930/1) Bridges.·
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flow of standard items.,,61 Vertically integrated wire companies, however, found the
technologies that realized economies of scale in both bulk and batch production involved
single purpose, high capital equipment and optimum payoffs when running at or near full
capacity. This was particularly the case in the rod and blooming mills where energy
losses sustained during start-up procedures could be minimized by keeping the reheat and
heat treating furnaces at constant temperatures and the Morgan rod mill and blooming
mill functioning continuously. The plant infrastructure, including the electrical and steam
generating facilities, massive water pumping works, and coal gas converters (prior to
switching to oil as the primary fuel), operated most efficiently under constant load.
While well suited to meeting wartime demand, the bulk production system did not
adequately accommodate the wide fluctuations that typified batch markets. Furthermore,
the vertically integrated, mass production system ofwire manufacturing had an inherently
high cost of obsolescence. By the 1950s, the Roeblings considered the price ofupdating
the continuous rod mill, the steam powered blooming mill, and replacing the open hearth
furnaces with electric furnaces prohibitive, but compelled by a substantial increase in
demand for electricity from both the plant and village, they built a new electric generating
station in 1948.
Of the many innovations that aided the mass production ofwire, the introduction
of continuous wire drawing machines had perhaps the greatest impact on manufacturing
at Kinkora.62 Installation of the continuous wire drawing machines began just prior to
WWII, and resulted in a number ofsignificant changes. Continuous wire drawing
61Scranton, "Diversity in Diversity," 38.
62See Appendix C.
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marked the decline of the skilled craftsmanship associated with Roebling single draft
machines that distinguished the company among their competitors. Quality wire still
required skilled oversight of the entire production process, but the skill increasingly
resided in machine operators using standardized equipment that ostensibly produced the
same wire for any company. The superior hardness ofcarbide dies in the continuous
machines enabled much longer lengths ofwire to be drawn, thus realizing several
economies of scale related to handling, shipping, and wire rod size. Thus, with the
advent of continuous wire drawing, economies of scale could be gained at each stage of
the wire drawing process, from pig iron to the reel ofwire on the shipping decks.
The increased wire drawing capacity spurred technological changes in related
processes such as cleaning and baking to supply the wire mills with more wire rods.
Because the cost of a continuous wire drawing machine was not prohibitively high for a
smaller company, the transformation ofwire drawing from a more labor intensive to
capital intensive operation did not necessarily drive smaller concerns from the industry.
Between 1939 and 1963, the number of companies drawing wire from purchased wire
rods modestly expanded from 135 to 198, but the bulk ofwire continued to be drawn by
larger, integrated firms. 63 Here, in the larger scale firms, the effect of continuous wire
drawing is difficult to discern fro~ the Census ofManufacturers due to their system of
classification, but the sale of two ofthe major independent, family-run firms, the
Wickwire Company and the John A. Roebling's Sons Company, to CF&I in the 1950s
was indicative ofthe declining prospects of integrated, independent wire manufacturing.
63Census ofManufacturers, 1947, 1954, 1963.
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Since the 1920s, the system ofwiremaking at Kinkora experienced a gradual
uncoupling of executive management from system technology and labor control. New
standardized technologies increased plant output and improved the uniformity of the
products, but also separated ownership from engineering and imparted an increasingly
financial focus. Threatened by deskilling and hoping to end cyclical wage policies, labor
sought its own voice through unionization. A system once designed to operate in
mutually supportive manner was now less viable in following the breakdown of
traditional coordination between management, labor, and technology.
7.0 CONCLUSION
In advertising and company publications, the Roeblings called attention to the uniqueness
of their history and experience. A centennial commemorative celebrated the lasting
family ownership of a ste~l works on the scale ofthe Roebling Company and highlighted
the role of the company in American wars from the Civil War to WWII. Past leaders
loomed large in the Roebling memory, the builder Charles Roebling, the financier
Ferdinand, bridge engineer Colonel Washington, perhaps surpassed only in significance
by the mythologized figure ofJohn Roebling, "the father" ofwire rope in America. The
distinctive contributions of these individuals and the Roebling Company could be found
in the tangible markers ofAmerican engineering ingenuity, the great cable suspension
bridges.
In certain respects, the Roebling history is indeed unique, but it provides more
general insights into the nature ofthe steel and wire industry as well. The Roebling
Company followed a path ofopportunity outside the boundaries set by the corporate steel
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oligopoly, and its history illustrated the degree to which family ownership was amenable
to an expansionist agenda built upon a rationalized production system. From a
perspective informed by Scranton's analysis of integrated anchors, the wire industry is
particularly interesting because custom, batch, bulk, and mass production used the same
basic technologies. The Roebling case suggests that vertical integration was a crucial
step for companies in the wire industry. Vertical integration proved problematic for a
bridge firm like the Roeblings, as the demand needed to realize economies ofscale in the
steel, rolling, and wire mills was not always provided by specialty markets. Our overall
understanding of the wire industry would benefit from further comparative studies ofhow
other types ofwire companies, family-owned or "mini" mills dedicated to solely to
drawing wire, fared against the integrated, corporate finns.
The analysis ofthe Roebling Company has depended on the language of
economics and technology -- vertical integration, economies of scale, capital versus labor
intensive manufacturing, batch versus mass production -- to examine how the company
fit into the industrial frameworks established by Chandler and Scranton, but ultimately
the dialogue ofpersonal relations among the owners, labor, and Roebling community
figured prominently in the Roebling history. Unlike family owners of smaller companies
that sought long term moderate growth or simply survival, passing up markets that
intruded too closely on the domains oflarger enterprises, the Roeblings largely pursued
expansion and maintained a progressive attitude toward technological innovation, despite
its suitability for mass markets. Industrial personalism, which extended to the workers'
families through the company village, constituted an essential element of a technological
system designed to operate in both batch and mass production spheres.
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APPENDIX A-
This table illustrates the high number of companies with access to open hearth furnace
steel for the manufacture ofwire-rods in 1904. Except where noted, Bessemer converters
are not included in the table.
COMPANIES MANUFACTURING ASSOCIATED STEEL WORKS WITH
WIRE-RODS OPEN HEARTH FURNACES
(plant name, location, #, ) capacity and type
US Steel
American Steel and Wire Company
Allentown Works, Allentown, PA
American Works, Cleveland, OH
Anderson Works, Anderson, IN
Braddock Works, Braddock, PA
Consolidated Works, Cleveland, OH
Donora Works, Donora, PA
H.P. Works, Cleveland, OH
Newburgh Steel Works, Newburgh, OH Newburgh Steel Works, Newburgh, OH 5-50 ton, (2 acid, 3 basic)
New Castle Works, New Castle, PA
Rankin Works, Rankin Station, PA
Sharon Works, Sharon, PA
Waukegan Works, Waukegan, IL
Worcester Works, Worcester, MA Worcester works, MA
8-various (5 acid, 3 basic)
Other US Steel steel works:
Everett, Middlesex, MA 2-15 ton (acid)
Vandergrift Works, MA 8-30 ton (acid)
Wood's Works, McKeesport, PA 2-15 ton (acid)
Donora Steel Works, Donora, PA 12-15 ton (basic)
Duquesne Steel Works, Cochran, PA 14-50 ton (basic)
Homestead Steel Works, Munhall, PA 50-various (basic)
Sharon steel Works and South Works, 6-40 ton, 12-50 ton (basic)
Sharon,PA
Federal Steel Company - Illinois Steel Company
Joliet Works, Joliet, IL South Works, South Chicago, IL 10-various (basic)
Alabama Steel and Wire Company
Birmingham Works, Ensley, AL Gadsden Works, Birmingham, AL 4-50 ton (basic)
Ashland Steel Company
Ashland works, Ashland, KY Ashland works, Ashland, KY 2-5.5 ton Bessemer
Converters
Carpenter Steel Company
Reading works, Reading, PA Reading works, Reading, PA no open hearth facilities, 8
experimental crucible
steel "melting holes"
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company
Minnequa Rolling Mills and Steel Works, Minnequa Rolling Mills and Steel Works, 6-50 ton (I acid, 5 basic)
Pueblo,CO Pueblo,CO
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COMPANIES MANUFACTURING ASSOCIATED STEEL WORKS WITH
WIRE-RODS OPEN HEARTH FURNACES
(plant name, location, #, ) capacity and type
Crucible Steel Company
Atha Steel Works Aliquippa Steel Works, Aliquippa, PA 1-15 ton acid
Black Diamond Steel Works, Pittsburgh, PA 8-various (5 acid, 3 basic)
Crescent Steel Works, Pittsburgh, PA 2-15 ton (unknown)
Howe, Brown & Co., Pittsburgh, PA 1-15 ton (acid), 1-20 ton
(basic)
La Belle Steel Works, Allegheny, PA 2-15 ton (acid)
Pittsburgh Steel Works, McKees Rocks, PA 1-20 ton (acid)
Cuyahoga Wire and Fence Company no iron or steel making
Cuyahoga Falls Plant, Cuyahoga Falls, OH capabilities
Dillon-Griswold Wire Company no iron or steel making
Sterling works, Sterling, IL capabilities, plant idle
Grand Crossing Tack Company
Grand Crossing Works, Grand Crossing, IL Grand Crossing Works, Grand Crossing, IL 2-40 ton (basic)
John A. Roebling's Sons Company planning 6-30 ton open
Kinkora Works, Roebling, NJ hearth furnaces (3 acid, 3
basic)
Kokomo Steel and Wire Company lIO iron or steel making
Kokomo works, Kokomo, IN capabilities
McCoy-linn Iron Company no open hearth facilities,
Milesburg Iron Works, Milesburg, PA 3 single puddling furnaces
National Steel and Wire Company
New Haven Works, New Haven, CT National Steel Foundry Company, New 2-25 ton (acid)
Haven,CT
Page Woven Wire Fence Company
Monessen works, Monessen, PA Monnessen Plant, Monessen, PA 2-15 ton (basic)
Pittsburgh Steel Company planning to install basic
Monessen Works, Monessen, PA open hearth furnaces
Trenton Iron Company no iron or steel making
Trenton Works, Trenton, NJ capabilities
United States Wire and Nail Company no iron or steel making
Shousetown works, Lewis Block, PA capabilities, idle and for
sale
Washburn Wire Company
Phillipsdale Plant, Phillipsda1e, RI Phillipsda1e Plant, Phillipsdale, RI 2"15 ton (1 acid, 1 basic)
Wickwire Brothers
Cortland Works, Cortland, NY Cortland Works, Cortland, NY 2-30 ton (basic)
Source: The American Iron and Steel Association, Directory to the Iron and Steel Works
ofthe United States (philadelphia: The American Iron and Steel Association, 1904).
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APPENDIX B - Plant Processes and Manufacturing Technologies
Making steel wire from raw materials involved several phases, which at the turn of the
century took place in separate mills, shops, or "houses." Rail cars carried pig iron,· scrap
iron, and various additives to the steel mill that produced cast steel ingots, measuring
some twelve inches square (in later years, ingots had a larger cross-sectional area), five
feet tall and weighing close to one ton. The ingots were heated and rolled to a smaller
cross-section and longer length in the blooming mill, reheated, and rolled into a rod
measuring approximately one quarter inch in diameter and several hundred feet long in
the rod mill. Rods were heat treated, cleaned of scale and baked before entering the wire
mills. At a diameter near 0.207 inches (No. 5 gage), it becomes more expedient to further
reduce a rod by drawing it through a die than to continue rolling. This drawing process as
described in the body of the thesis was done in the wire mills. While some wire was
shipped straight from the wire mills, several products required a finishing treatment, such
as galvanizing, that applied a thin, metallic protective coating to the wire. With the
exception ofwire drawing, covered in Appendix C, the following provides a brief
discussion of the development ofthe various processes, and how they fit in to the
Roebling scheme ofproduction.
The Steel Mill
As previously mentioned, the installation of open hearth furnaces at Kinkora followed a
general trend in the steel industry. The specifics of furnace design, however, differed
widely among plants. The variety of equipment types, steel mill layouts, and operating
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practices slowed the diffusion of open hearth technology, with the result that experience
gained in one situation was not readily transferable to others.64 Attempting to wrest
:~
maximum output and quality from the furnaces, chemists and engineers kept the methods
and equipment used in open hearth steelmaking in constant flux. In the 1890s, the work
ofErnest Saniter, IH. Darby, Benjamin Talbot, Ernst Bertrand and Thiel in
desulphurization, recarburization and charging molten metal revealed that a standardized
practice in steel making was not to be realized in the near future. These innovators
introduced different methods for improving the quality of steel by focusing on the effects
ofvarying its chemical composition and temperature during the melting process.65
Similarly, open hearth furnace design in America branched in the late 1880s, when H.H.
Campbell and S.T. Wellman introduced two types oftilting open-hearth furnaces that
rotated the furnace on its longitudinal axis to ease slag removal and tapping operations.
Perhaps deterred by the higher cost and complexity of the tilting furnace, Charles
Roebling hired Swedish furnace engineer I Ecklund from American Steel & Wire
Company's Worcester South Works to design stationary open hearths at Kinkora.66
Ecklund brought several countrymen to assist in the construction and operation ofthe
furnaces; thus, the core ofthe first steel men at Kinkora were known as "the Swedes."
Since 1880, open hearth furnaces had steadily gained acceptance in the United
States, surpassing the Bessemer converter in 1908 as the most favored method ofmaking
64Gold, et aI., Technological Progress and Industrial Leadership, 537.
65Por a concise description of the significant experiments in late nineteenth-
century steelmaking, see Barraclough, Steelmaking, 270-97.
66"The New Roebling Works," Iron Age (April 26,1906)
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steeI.67 The definitive manual of steelmaking in the U.S., The Making, Shaping and
Treating ofSteel, summarized the advantages of the open hearth process:
(1) By the use ofore as an oxidizing agent and by the external application
ofheat, the temperature ofthe bath is made independent of the purifying
reactions, and the elimination of the impurities can be made to take place
gradually, so that both the temperature and the composition of the bath are
under much better control than in the bessemer process. (2) For the same
reasons, a greater varietY ofraw materials can be used and a greater variety
ofproducts can be produced... . (3) A very important advantage is due to
the increased output of finished steel from the same amount ofpig iron,
which means that fewer blast furnaces are required to produce a given
tonnage of steeI.68
Although open hearth furnaces continued as the favored method of steel making in the
first half ofthe twentieth century, the development of electric arc furnaces and the basic
oxygen process (BOP) gained wider use in the post-war steel industry.69
The Blooming Mill
Rolling in most blooming mills utilized either a two-high reversible or three-high mills.
In deciding to adopt a less expensive three-high arrangement, Charles Roebling sacrificed
some flexibility with respect to the size of the billet to gain a higher output rate. Because
the three-high mill required a means oflowering and raising the ingot as it passed through
the upper and lower sets of rollers, Charles patented a hydraulic tilting table with a
67Gold, et aI., Technological Progress and Industrial Leadership, 531; and
Backert, ed., The ABC ofSteel, 133.
68McGannon, The Making, Shaping and Treating ofSteel, 28.
69For a discussion of the advantages that encouraged.use of electric furnaces and
the BOP, see ibid., 29-34.
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system of guides that simultaneously turned and guided the ingot into the proper position
between the rollers as it was lifted.
During his last years as company president, Charles Roebling had continued to
modify manufacturing at Kinkora with an eye towards future expansion. His plan to
overhaul the blooming mill was carried out in 1920 by his nephew, company president
Karl G. Roebling, who incorporated a new 36" mill to replace the existing 26" mill. The
new system rolled harder steel more easily and quickly, and permitted future
consideration ofusing larger ingots. Operation ofthe steam-powered, 36" blooming mill
continued until the cessation of steel manufacturing in 1982.
The Development of Rod Mills
At the turn ofthe century, two competing rod mill arrangements, named after their
inventors William Garrett and Charles Morgan, dominated rod rolling in the United
States. Both methods represented improvements on older technologies - Garrett on the
Belgian or looping mills and Morgan on George Bedson's straight line continuous mill
- and each offered certain advantages and drawbacks. The Roeblings transferred their
existing Garrett-type mill and experienced operators from Trenton to Kinkora, but
Charles modified this arrangement by adding a group of continuous roughing stands to
the looping mill to gain the benefits offered by each type. This combination oflooping
and continuous mills in rod rolling, although replaced by a fully continuous arrangement
in 1928, later proved a favored design in many modem rod mills.
Garrett mills faced an increasingly strong challenge from continuous mills that
benefitted from improvements in electric motors and gearing that remedied timing
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problems. While the modified Garrett mill in rod mill number one offered certain
advantages, the rods cooled non-uniformly on the looping floor, imparting a variation in
temper that especially affected high carbon stock.70 Moreover, the limitations on bundle
size in the Garrett mills became more acute as improved dies of either chilled cast iron or
hardened steel allowed longer lengths ofwire to be drawn. Furthermore, as the Morgan
Company led research and development efforts to refine continuous rod mill technology,
it began to capture a larger share of the growing continuous rod mill market. Although
purchase of a Morgan rod mill represented a substantial investment, it held the potential
to roll larger bundles and increased output rates for similar products. Despite these
trends, the first construction to supplement capacity at Kinkora used a Belgian-type
looping arrangement well-suited to rolling rods ofvarious shapes and sizes. This smaller,
second rod mill built in 1922 was likely added to maintain a level of flexibility for
specialized rod production that was difficult to achieve in continuous mills and to sustain
rod rolling during the eventual alteration or replacement ofrod mill number one.
Although the demand heightened the need for increased rod production, the record
bridge spans encouraged adoption of a rod rolling technology that could produce larger
rod bundles, and concomitantly, longer wire. In 1928, buoyed by orders for elevator
cables and the 1927 contract for the Hudson River (George Washington) Bridge, the
JARSCO recorded its highest level ofsales in an eighteen-year period. Subsequently, the
board of directors allocated funds for a four-train 18" billet mill needed to roll a billet of a
smaller cross sectional area and a Morgan rod mill in December of 1927. In contrast to
7°Backert, The ABC ofSteel, 187.
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Charles Roebling's personal design of the old mill, the new mill featured nearly all
Morgan equipment, including a Morgan billet reheating furnace and rolling stands,
installed by Morgan engineers. While the skilled catchers used in the old looping mill
could still find work in rod mill number two, their role was substantially diminished and
separated from production of the standard high carbon rod now rolled by the new number
one rod mill.
Heat Treatment
The heat treatment ofwire and rods varied widely between products. Turn-of-the-century
wire manufacturers recognized two primary divisions in heat treating metal: tempering
and annealing. The label of "Tempering House" common to wire plants in the first
decades ofthe twentieth century reflected the generalized understanding ofheat treatment
that lumped together several different forms ofheat treatment. For example, the primary
function of the Kinkora tempering house was patenting rather than tempering. Although
future developments in metallography revealed the radical transformations that
distinguished the variQus processes ofheat treatment, the ingrained misnomer ofthe
"tempering" house remained.
Methods of annealing metal after cold working to restore ductility had been in use
for centuries, and were particularly useful in alleviating internal stresses generated by
wire drawing. The annealing house used an established system ofheating coils ofwire
in sealed pots to the desired temperature range (dependent on the desired properties -
"full" anneal austentized the steel at higher than critical temperatures, "process" anneal
involved sub-critical heating) followed by a period of slow cooling. Because annealing
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was primarily applied to low carbon steel, less attention was focused on innovating the
process at Kinkora.
In contrast, the Roeblings paid great attention to patenting, a form ofheat
treatment particular to high carbon wire. Patenting developed in a highly proprietary
manner that reflected the influence a single technique could have on the quality and
success of a product. During the first years ofpatenting wire in the second halfof the
nineteenth century, a noted consultant and historian of the wire industry, Kenneth Lewis,
described the secrecy surrounding early efforts:
What I chiefly remember about patenting is that the earlier installations
were surrounded by high board fences so others in the room could see
nothing that went on inside. Entrance was through locked doors, wire was
passed in through holes in the fence and the finished product passed out in
the same manner, and the workers inside were confined to specific tasks so
that practically nobody could know the whole process.71
Even well into the twentieth century, the Roeblings guarded the details of their patenting
process. Tours granted the New York branch ofthe Society ofElectrical Engineers and
visiting Japanese steel manufacturers in the 1930s excluded inspection ofthe patenting
area.72
Patenting imparted both high strength and a measure ofductility to high carbon
steel before drawing, thus permitting several drafts ofthe wire without prohibitive loss of
the high strength needed for its use in bridges or superior wire ropes. Patenting roughly
consisted ofheating to atemperature well above the critical range to reform the
71Kenneth Lewis, Steel Wire in America (Stamford, CT: The Wire Association,
1952), 194.
72Interview with John Hodson; and "John A. Roebling's Sons Company's Vast
Wire Plant Thrown Open to the New York Electrical Society: See Hudson River Bridge
Cables Made and Tested," Telephone and Telegraph Age (May 16, 1929).
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microstructure of the steel, followed by a relatively rapid and controlled quench. In
theory, detailed knowledge ofthe relation between time, temperature, quenching medium,
............._J.
grain size, and the microstructure awaited the electron microscope and research in
metallography that began to broaden understanding ofmaterial science after 1930.73
Evidence of the particularly empirical approach to developing an effective system of
patenting in the early wire industry had two salient manifestations. First, the successful
set up and operation ofheat treatment rigs generated a cadre of skilled engineers that, by
force ofreputation, could influence the marketability of the product. Years ofexperience
in determining effective combinations of equipment and practice played a particularly
crucial role in patenting innovation. Second, confusion marked discussion among experts
in the wire industry, as late as 1932, regarding exactly what was happening to the wire as
it passed through the stages ofthe patenting process. Without a comprehensive
theoretical guide, practical experience and reasoned experiment fueled the progress of
patenting technology. If the case ofKinkora can been taken as the likely state ofwire
plants in general, the design ofpatenting rigs was a protean endeavor, with many variants
coexisting within the tempering house. Charles Roebling's first method of lead
patenting had actually proved better than his subsequent attempts, to which Washington
Roebling noted "why, no one knoWS.,,74 Early patenting at Kinkora followed a method
referred to as air patenting, with wire rods heated by furnaces from thirty to eighty feet in
length and quenched in air, but later models experimented with other heating and
73W.H. Dennis, A Hundred Years ofMetallurgy (Chicago: Aldin Publishing
Company, 1964),328-31.
74Schyuler, The Roeblings, 345.
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quenching agents such as lead. The high reputation ofRoebling bridge wire drawn from
patented rods attested to the skillful process design in vital aspect ofwire manufacturing.
The Cleaning House
An adage in the wire industry held that "a wire well cleaned is halfdrawn." Heating steel
during hot rolling or annealing fonned a hard, brittle oxide on the rod or wire known as
mill scale. If improperly removed by cleaning, the scale scratched~~es ·lll1d resulted in
off-gage wire. The rod cleaning operation at Kinkora followed an established sequence
of immersion in an acid bath, a water rinse, a lime coating, and a period ofbaking. A
quality clean depended on the foreman's control of the temperature and duration of the
immersion of each step of the cleaning process, which varied between different products.
Too long ofsoak in the acid resulted in a condition known as acid brittleness that could
be difficult to detect until the wire failed weeks or months later. Overbaking a rod
reduced the effectiveness ofthe lime coating that aided lubrication during drawing.
Perhaps most importantly for bridge wire, skillful application of a "sull" coat during
cleaning provided an essential aid to lubrication.75 While rods intended for dry drawing
relied on the lime and sull coatings for lubrication, finer wire frequently employed a
''wet'' coating applied by a dip in copper or tin sulphates.76
75After the acid bath, a light spray ofwater allowed to dry on the rod fonned a
film of iron oxide that acted as a lubricant. A good rust coat, one steel manufacturing
manual advised, pennits rods to be given heavier drafts and to be drawn more drafts
before being annealed. This "sun" coat was an essential part of lubricating bridge wire
during drawing. See Backert, ed., The ABC ofSteel, 190
76The sulphate bath fonns a metallic coating on the wire that facilitates drawing
fine wire. To prevent exposure to atmospheric contaminants, the coated wire is usually
kept in a mixture ofwater and lubricating soap. McGannon, ed., Making Shaping, and
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The original number one cleaning house at Kinkora employed a circle crane to
raise and lower coils of rods in the various tanks of acid, water, and lime, which formed a
semi-circular pattern about the crane. The cleaning house contained four cleaning
stations, each one attended by a cleaning "gang." Most jobs in the plant had two shifts,
but because the cleaned rods required an overnight baking, the cleaning gangs worked
one shift from 8 am to 4 pm. The gang operated much like a team, comprised daily of the
same personnel led by a gang foreman, with a numerical designation that identified its
station, but had skill connotations as well. For example, the number one cleaning gang
handled the most critical job of cleaning all the rods intended for Roebling bridge wire.
After cleaning and coating, coils ofrods were loaded on to baker trucks, and wheeled into
a row of ovens for a ten to twelve hour bake. Roughly one million lbs. ofrod coils were
processed during the cleaning shift to provide wire mill number one with its next day's
allotment of rod coils.
The superior hardness of carbide dies introduced in the eady 1930s obviated the
need for the heavy sull coat so essential to lubrication in previous methods ofdrawing
high carbon wire. Baking the rods after cleaning, which had formedy required heating to
relatively low temperatures for a twelve hour period to avoid burning the lime and SUll
coating, could now be accomplished with five to fifteen minute exposures to temperatures
between 450 and 600 F in "flash bakers." The increasing use of"inhibitors" during the
cleaning process further contributed to the viability of this new technology by reducing
the threat of acid brittleness that was normally alleviated by the longer baking time.
Treating ofSteel, 831.
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Elimination of the twelve hour baking period radically altered the pattern ofrod delivery
to the wire mills. No longer did wiremen begin their day with an allotment ofrecently
baked rods, as the flash bakers supplied rods nearly as fast as the deaning house
processing permitted. Consequently, a system of"straight line" cleaning houses emerged
to clean rods more quickly. Constructed in 1943, a row of acid, water, and lime (or
borax) tanks with rigid temperature and time controls and serviced by an overhead crane
displaced the circular cleaning stations and cleaning house gangs. At the end of the
cleaning line, several tank-like flash bakers handled the task ofrod drying that was
previously done in a row of fifteen alley-type drying ovens that ran the length ofthe north
wall ofwire mill number one. After lying idle for a few years, the company tore down
the old drying ovens in 1947.
Finishing in the Galvanizing Shop
Several products required specialized finishing procedures, such as the application of
protective or insulating coatings. The Trenton facility handled the insulating processes
for electrical wire, while the Kinkora Works housed most ofthe galvanizing apparatus.
Like patenting, 'informed experimentation' guided the development of the galvanizing
process to apply a corrosion-resistant zinc coating to iron or steel wire. When the
Roeblings began to explore galvanizing for the booming telegraph wire market in the
1870s, methods ofheating and cleaning the wire before a dip in molten zinc proceeded on
a trial and error basis. Cost had to balance quality in applying the zinc coating - too
thick could be excessively expensive; too thin resulted in an inferior product. Skilled
galvanizers were vital to advancing the art of galvanizing that depended on intuition and
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experience. For certain wire that required extra corrosion resistance, the Roeblings
developed a method of"double galvanizing" and marketed the product as "Extra Best
Best Galvanized." Several of the original galvanizing rigs erected by Charles Roebling in
the Kinkora Galvanizing Shop had double galvanizing capabilities.
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APPENDIX C - Wire Drawing
The system that developed in the nineteenth century to pull a wire through a
lubricated die with a power driven spool or "block" involved a relatively low-level of
technology that had attracted only three patents up until 1889. Foremost among the few
companies that manufactured drawing machines, the Vaughn Company equipped many
ofthe wire mills built in the first decades of the twentieth century, but Charles Roebling
designed and built nearly all the original wire drawing machines at Kinkora.
In 1911, the John A. Roebling's Sons Company could boast ofoperating the
largest wire drawing facilities in the country. In the basements ofKinkora wire mills
number one and two, a central steam engine powered a drive train geared to rows ofwire
drawing benches. Nearly all wire received an initial draft in wire mill number one.
Higher carbon wire remained in the number one mill for further reduction to diameters
between 0.500 and 0.060 inches. Wire mill number two drew wire into finer sizes,
typically from 0.060 to 0.015 inches in diameter. Within each mill, bench design varied
to fit specific product requirements. Drawing higher carbon wire required larger diameter
blocks and greater power, while finer sizes were usually "wet drawn" on single draft or
early continuous machines. Charles Roebling divided the parallel rows ofbenches into
sections, each identified by alphabetic designators. Section C contained the specially-
built bridge bench that drew all the wire for Roebling bridges from 1907 until 1941. To
accommodate increased demand, the Roeblings erected a third wire mill in 1914 to draw
low carbon fine wire, and a fourth eventually called the Bridge Shop in 1923.77 Aside
77Although some wire was drawn in the Bridge Shop, its primary purpose (and
sole purpose at a later date) was to prepare reels ofwire rope intended for bridge sites.
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from the switch to electrically powered benches in 1928, until WWIJ. the bulk of the
Kinkora wire mills utilized practices and machinery that had undergone few
technological changes since the late nineteenth century.7lr--------
Although single draft machines drew the bulk ofthe wire made until the 1930s,
the idea ofcontinuous or multiple die drawing had long been pursued by enterprising
inventors and engineers aware of the obvious advantage of an increased rate ofoutput.
The author of a 1907 Iron Age article found that the desirability ofmultiple die system
"had been recognized for many years, and various abortive attempts had been made in
this country and in Europe, some ofwhich had shown great financial courage and
persistence on the part ofthe capitalists and inventors,'>79 to produce such a machine.
Another wire industry consultant marveled after a visit to the Bethlehem Steel Works at a
process in which "a material of small and uniform cross-section in practically endless
lengths subjected to a long series of identical operations would seem not merely to invite
but to practically compel continuous treatment and yet it was treated non-continuously in
a perfect bedlam ofconfusion.,,80 The great power needed to "dry draw" rods and the
difficulties encountered in aligning the speed ofthe revolving blocks to match the
elongation ofthe wire proved an insurmountable hurdle for early attempts at continuous
drawing. The intense generation ofheat in drawing, die life, and means of lubrication
78Information in this paragraph from John A. Roebling's Sons Company, The
Roebling Story (Trenton: John A. Roebling's Sons Company, 1941); and John Hodson,
interview by the author, July 22 and July 28, 1997.
79W.W. Gibbs, "Wire Drawing: The Second Step in a Useful Art," Iron Age
(January 3, 1907): 18.
8°Lewis, Steel Wire in America, 218.
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provided further complications that prevented general use ofmultiple die machines in dry
drawing. Because wet drawing fine wire mitigated the impact of these factors, some
specialized multiple die machines successfully produced fine wire. Cognizant of the
benefits this technology held for their limited production of fine wire, the JARSCO
ordered ten continuous machines from Robert Wetherill & Company in March, 1916 for
wire mill number two.
Successful solution of the continuous drawing problem held the potential to
revolutionize wire drawing. In 1907, W.W. Gibbs, general manager of the Shenandoah
Steel Wire Company ofBuffalo, N.Y., heralded the development of a multiple die
machine capable of drawing all sizes ofwire by the Iroquois Machine Company. He
foresaw that the use of these machines in his model mill under construction would nearly
abolish the use 'of skilled labor, boasting that "only five men in the new mill will have
had any previous knowledge ofwire, or the wire business," and that in the new system
women would be employed to draw all wire finer than No. 21.5 gage. Gibbs stated that
based on actual test data, a man who once produced 9600 lb. on single draft units in a 24
hour period could now produce 60,000 lbs using the multiple die machines. 81
Unfortunately, the actual performance ofthe Iroquois machines never lived up to Gibbs's
praise, and the Shenandoah Steel Wire Company disappeared.
Although the conversion of the durable Roebling-designed wire drawing
machines to electrical power in 1928 reflected the satisfactory performance of the single
draft system, the JARSCO kept abreast of the slow progress toward practical multiple die
81Gibbs, "Wire Drawing: The Second Step in a Useful Art," 24-25.
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machines. The small number of continuous machines had proved useful in wet drawing
fine wire, and the company experimented with four Nullmeyer dual die machines in
1926. A 1929 engineering order to remove one ofthe Nullmeyers from storage and ship
it to Trenton indicated the value of their contribution to production. In the same year,
however, the purchase of three Type A Morgan-Connor continuous machines introduced
a new wire drawing technology that signaled the eventual end ofthe prominence of single
draft drawing at Kinkora.
The Morgan Company acquired a viable platform for continuous drawing from an
English firm, the Connor-Singer Wire Company, after World War I and spent several
years refining and marketing their new Morgan-Connor machine. Company
representatives discovered that selling the new machines to traditional wire drawers
proved a difficult task. Morgan engineer Kenneth Lewis felt that the continuous
machines activated a worker's instinct, deeply ingrained, which warns him of impending
revolution. Lewis remembered the tribulations ofthe demonstrator he hired to promote
the Morgan-Connor machines:
He was a genial cuss, a big man, a big tonnage producer in orthodox work,
but the wiredrawers hazed him unmercifully with never a word from the
foremen or superintendents. He had to clean the sand out ofhis soapbox
every morning and after a trip to the latrine, and after running a while on
rod bundles cleverly cut into about six pieces he had to adopt the practice
of going into the baker and picking out his own rods, with one eye cocked
toward his machines the while. If these machines hadn't been beautifully
engineered, rugged, virtually foolproof, and soundly and thoroughly
demonstrated and advertised, they would have flopped.82
Morgan's main competitor in the wire drawing machine business, the Vaughn Company,
82Lewis, Steel Wire in America, 229.
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responded by developing a different continuous technology in their "Motoblox" benches.
The two companies largely divided future sales ofwire drawing machines between them.
Prior to the introduction of tungsten carbide dies, however, continuous machines held
little potential for drawing the bulk ofhigh carbon, larger diameter wire at Kinkora.
The origins of the carbide die lay in the German Osram Company's work during
the last stages ofWWI to find a substitute for the diamonds used in drawing light bulb
filaments. Because the superior hardness of the tungsten carbide greatly extended die
life, generated less die heat and decreased the lubrication needed to draw wire, the carbide
dies particularly benefitted dry drawing in continuous machines. As in the case of the
early Morgan-Connor machines, the threat posed by the new dies to the tradition-bred
skills of the wire drawers and diemen resulted in reported cases ofmisplaced shipments
of carbide dies that later turned up under basement floors or in rivers.83 Superior
performance eventually overcame the initial resistence, and by the mid-1930s carbide
dies had replaced virtually all older types of iron and steel dies. Contemporaneously, the
JARSCO won the contract to provide and erect the cables for what would be the longest-
span suspension bridge in the world, the Golden Gate Bridge. The conditions appeared
favorable for the conversion to continuous drawing at Kinkora with the new dies, yet this
development was still several years away. In 1939, the JARSCO first purchased Morgan-
Connor machines intended for the number one wire mill, and in 1941 three type "BW"
six-block machines replaced Charles Roebling's single draft benches in aisle A,84 To
83Ibid., 241.
84John A, Roebling's Sons Company, "Engineering order #9484-A," Januaryl6,
1941, Environmental Protection Agency - Edison, New Jersey storage facility.
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prepare for the expected surge in wartime demand, in July 1941 the JARSeO ordered
eleven new Vaughn Motoblox machines for wire mill number one. Although Vaughn
and Morgan-Connor machines continued to supplant the older benches, a 1942
engineering order to construct twenty-four water-cooled blocks for conventional benches
demonstrated that single draft drawing still had a place at Kinkora. Nevertheless, by the
end ofWWII, the pervasive use ofcarbide die-equipped, continuous drawing initiated an
era of substantial changes that restructured the technological system ofwire making at
Kinkora.
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APPENDIX D - Fundamental Operating Statistics
Year Sales Dividend Total Profit Year Sales Dividend Total Profit
1877 805,542 111,000 205,754 1915 3,000,000
1878 761,548 85,000 103,493 1916 5,100,000
1879 1,197,302 75,000 298,962 1917 4,050,000
1880 1,768,995 100,000 249,997 1918 3,000,000
1881 1,561,243 100,000 246,561 1919 24,000,000 5,607,598
1882 1,969,423 100,000 333,765 1920 2,400,000
1883 1,920,339 100,000 308,713 1921 900,000
1884 1,785,122 100,000 467,814 1922 2,100,000
1885 1,430,041 125,000 259,345 1923 2,415,000 7,508,866
1886 2,025,612 100,000 420,456 1924 24,803,487 4,140,000 5,384,699
1887 2,607,599 100,000 542,697 1925 25,156,627 3,105,000 5,438,225
1888 2,705,093 170,000 482,165 1926 28,221,460 4,140,000 6,116,924
1889 2,984,763 200,000 660,584 1927 22,748,155 5,865,000 4,769,323
1890 4,553,790 20,000 879,120 1928 28,866,243 4,830,000 7,337,710
1891 1929 26,723,676 5,520,000 13,235,176
1892 4,450,513 25,000 528,421 1930 21,733,310 7,590,000 2,641,547
1893 4,531,220 25,000 686,455 1931 15,229,013 3,450,000 90,612
1894 5,455,457 25,000 217,849 1932 8,350,876 1,380,000 -2,409,420
1895 5,565,526 25,000 650,661 1933 10,427,694 431,250 835,156
1896 5,409,213 25,000 845,492 1934 12,838,171 690,000 591,180
1897 6,196,837 25,000 731,414 1335 15,452,281 862,500 1,435,687
1898 6,994,984 25,000 1,492,265 1936 20,507,609 1,811,250 2,261,188
1899 10,874,292 500,000 2,727,516 1937 21,204,238 1,725,000 1,902,671
1900 900,000 1938 13,936,842 427,656 -310,754
1901 1,647,273 1939 15,830,250 427,651 395,857
1902 600,000 1,861,165 1940 22,461,190 513,174 833,703
1903 750,000 1,544,059 1941 36,972,709 1,026,348 1,467,958
1904 750,000 891,818 1942 52,492,189 1,539,522 8,064,192
1905 500,000 2,202,067 1943 56,803,336 1,539,522 5,876,105
1906 75,000 2,924,835 1944 54,538,494 1,539,520 4,535,709
1907 2,837,128 1945 41,501,846 1,539,521 1,499,435
1908 650,000 313,333 1946 33,411,624 1,539,522 777,388
1909 1,000,000 1,696,164 1947 48,630,616 1,539,522 3,798,731
1910 750,000 1,871,781 1948 49,908,514 1,197,406 1,665,357
1911 1,050,000 2,756,421 1949 45,214,459 855,288 55,757
1912 1,200,000 3,454,141 1950 54,044,330 1,111,874 3,983,657
1913 2,025,000 2,986,983 1951 66,688,584 1,710,575 6,439,129
1914 975,000 1,318,183 1952 67,386,975 8,491,782
Data for table taken from Zink and Hartman, Spanning the Industrial Age, 190; and John
A. Roebling's Sons Company, "Financial Report of Company" in "Business Records of
JARSCO 1876-1960," Accession 2315, Roebling Collection - Rutgers University.
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